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SYNOPSIS: THE IDENTIFICATION & MEASUREMENT OF SAFETY 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
This thesis presents a model for identifying, measuring and managing the risks of 
hazardous technologies. This paper is not targeted at any one domain, but identifies 
specific principles of safety management applicable to mining, manufacturing, maritime 
and aerospace industries. Further, the application of a principled and comprehensive 
programme intends to provide an effective safety culture for general industry. 
The model addresses safety management at three levels - senior, middle and supervisory 
- with the aim of identifying latent conditions and active errors in terms of accident 
causation. 
The author intends to show that human error is a consequence, not a cause, and that is 
shaped and provoked by upstream workplace and organisational factors. Only by 
understanding the context that caused the error can we hope to limit its recurrence. 
The thesis rejects the popular notion that "human error" is implicated in roughly eighty 
percent of all major accidents, and proposes that lack of guidelines at the managerial 
levels of organisations is responsible. This hypothesis was tested and proven at Koeberg 
Nuclear Power Station by the process of assigning programme elements with steering 
mechanisms to managers to facilitate evaluation of programme effectiveness. This 
programme was designed to locate, identify and track errors due to the existence of latent 
conditions and active failures in operational processes. Human error is thus 
conceptualised as a symptom. 
The validity of this approach was established by both qualitative and quantitative 
assessments. Evaluation of questionnaires clearly indicated the effectiveness of steering 
controls assigned to the three management levels. It confirmed that specific safety 
programme elements need to be assigned to managerial levels to facilitate effective 
behavioural response at the operational level. Significantly, the programme elements 
utilised provided three essential management functions to the organisation: the human, 
engineering and organisational management models. Scientific opinion has recognised 
the need to incorporate these models into management procedures. But current safety 
management programmes conceptually exclude the above models for lack of appropriate 
steering mechanisms. 
The author concludes therefore that the model implemented provides a practicable 
framework for safety management in general industry. Stressed is the function of error 
identification and containment in a framework of continuous evaluation of process safety. 
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1. CHAPTER ONE 
1.1 THE DISSERTATION 
Safety management systems are designed to maintain and defend hazardous technologies. 
Despite the sophistication of current safety programmes, the human factor is still instrumental 
in both causing and preventing accidents in industry. Although it has become fashionable to 
claim that human error is implicated in 80-90 per cent of all major accidents, perceived errors 
may be symptomatic of a more profound, yet less obvious cause, namely poor managerial · 
controls. Thus in the USA, Canada and South Africa, safety management systems are 
characterised by rigorous measurements of control which do not take into account human 
psychological response. Where appropriate behavioural response is constrained by 
prescriptive controls, the management system - and not the operators - carry the liability. 
Strategic industries or essential services have been characterised by safety system failures in 
the last two decades. The analysis of major accidents in the mining, manufacturing and 
maritime industries has invariably identified managerial failure as a basic causative factor. 
The following (by no means exhaustive) tabulation speaks for itself: 
Chernobyl 
Vaal Reefs (SA) 
'Piper Alpha' Oil 





Loss of nuclear reactor core inventory - design problems, 
managerial failure 
Locomotive plunging into mine shaft - procedural non-compliance, 
managerial failure 
Fire genesis induced by inappropriate procedure, managerial failure 
Roll-on/Roll-off ferry capsizes - design problems, procedural non-
compliance, managerial failure 
Leaking seals precipitate hydrogen explosion - design problems, 
managerial failure 
Methyl Isocynate (pesticide) leaks into the environment ( 6 000 
fatalities, 225 000 injured) - procedural problems, managerial 
failure 
These organisational accidents were analysed by leading authors in the field, and failures in 
terms of behavioural response have been attributed to failures in managerial controls. From the 
above we can deduce that the basic or root cause of major incidents is attributable to the degree 
of behavioural response induced by managerial controls. There is a lacuna in our knowledge 
and research base here. Several studies have shown that some of these accidents are caused by 
a combination of many factors whose roots can be found in the absence of human factors. 
While pioneering studies by Bird et al. (1974) identified the need for structured safety 
programmes in industry, these early researchers did not include measurements of behavioural 
response to safety control systems. There is now convincing evidence that unless persons 
respond favourably to system requirements, the structure of safety systems remains 
dangerously ineffective. 
Current safety management systems · lack the process to guide the behavioural response of 
persons. It is furthermore evident that existing safety management systems are programmed 
for acts of compliance only (ISRS, NOSA, Safety programmes: 1976-1998). All major recent 
accidents are characterised by acts or omissions indicating behavioural response managerial 
failure. Demonstrably, measurements of consequence were not carried out to establish how the 
required acts of compliance would affect the behavioural response of persons. Put differently, 
the stated objective of every safety system is to secure favourable compliance to programme 
standards. Implied, therefore, is the notion that the compliance factors can be sufficiently 
motivated by managers and supervisors to assure favourable behavioural response. The global 
experience of organisational accidents indicates, however, that the controlling function at the 
various management levels consistently fails to assure appropriate behavioural response. What 
we have, in effect, are national and international safety systems which have largely ignored the 
psychological response of people affected by those controls. 
As managerial failure constitutes the basic or root cause of accidents in organisations, the 
objective of this dissertation will be to analyse the controlling function at the various 
management levels. Accordingly, a controlling framework for each management level will be 
developed to assure behavioural response. The aim of this dissertation therefore, lies in the 
provision of a safety management programme to industry that will facilitate behavioural 
response in all operational facets. This programme will be implemented and evaluated at 
South Africa's only commercial nuclear power plant, namely Koeberg Nuclear Power Station. 
See Fig. 1. 
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Fig. 1 Exhibit lA Koeberg: basic controlling, management levels and behavioural response 
Koeberg, with its 3-tier management structure, will provide the basis for the evaluation of the 
controlling function at the various management levels. The safety programme previously 
followed at Koeberg, which conceptually excluded the specific controlling function for 
managers, will be extended or upgraded. 
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This upgrading will include assigning steering or evaluatory mechanisms to the vanous 
managerial levels, the primary purpose being the continuous evaluation of safety programme 
effectiveness. Measurements and evaluations of behavioural response by both managers and 
workers are to be conducted throughout a four year assessment period. 
1.1.1 On the main hypotheses: 
Central to the discussion presented in this analysis is the hypothesis that basic types of 
control can only be identified and measured in relation to an organisation's management 
levels. Accordingly, much of the argument developed in this paper is committed to: (a) 
demonstrating that writers in the field have failed to establish a relationship between the basic 
controls of a safety programme and managerial levels and therefore to: (b) develop a safety 
programme whereby the identification and measurement of basic controls is conceptually 
integrated with management levels. 
A secondary hypothesis is that basic types of control, conceptually integrated in safety 
programme elements, can induce persons to respond appropriately to the needs of a 
safety system. Secondary aims therefore are: (a) to analyse the effectiveness of steering 
controls integrated in safety programme elements (b) to assess the effectiveness of steering 
controls in relation to the behavioural response of persons and ( c) to complete a reference work 
containing details of models which have been used in the identification and measurement of 
safety programme elements. Both the central and secondary hypotheses embrace concepts 
not previously applied to safety management systems. 
Finally, a dissertation of this nature raises a social dichotomy - the extent of moral and legal 
accountabilities of strategic industries in the broader framework of society. It follows that the 
overt purpose of this dissertation lies in the provision of a safety mechanism designed to 
comply with the moral and legal obligation ·of business which is, in the words of NASA 
specialist J.Lederer to Congress, 'ultimately to prevent safety system default as the 
consequences of failure are becoming less and less permissible as we continue to take risks of 
greater magnitude than in the past' (1984). The author of this dissertation is thus concerned 
with the Achilles heel of current safety management systems. 
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committee with evaluatory powers. Such a safety committee will be chaired by the middle 
manager, with a designated membership comprising of supervisors and worker elected safety 
representatives. This committee will be empowered to evaluate programme effectiveness at 
the supervisor/worker level. The function of the support programme elements is to measure 
compliance to existing programme standards at the supervisory management level. Further, 
accident/incident causative factors will be established by the support programme elements and 
submitted for a final evaluation to the senior management level. 
1.2.4 Third Tier: Supervisory Management Level 
Here a strategic programme element linked to five support programme elements is identified. 
The purpose of the strategic element lies in the provision of operational safety standards for the 
worker level. · This element will not provide a steering or evaluatory mechanism. This 
function is provided by the support programme elements, with measurements of compliance 
controlled by supervisors and workers. Research emphasis will endeavour to determine 
whether latent and active errors are identified at the 'rock face' or operational levels. This area 
is considered critical for it will test, inter alia, the effectiveness of the role of middle and 
senior management in terms of basic controlling. 
1.2.5 Research Process 
Because the safety mechanisms tested in this study were, of necessity, limited to the South 
African context (and moreover, to Koeberg Nuclear Plant itself), the thesis cannot 
categorically assert a universal applicability. However, the analysis of major accidents by 
world experts suggests that the central tenets of this thesis are germane to the entire industry. 
1.2.5.1 reliability and accuracy 
Safety system analysis involves a mix of factual observations and measurements of 
compliance. Assessors must recognise this fact, as well as the fact that questionnaire 
construction and evaluation can result in biased assessments. The method is qualitative 
and utilises questionnaires to assess the measure of behavioural response induced by a 
restructured safety system. The main advantages of the qualitative method over 
detailed audit reports (which include detailed inspections of the place of work and in 
loco inspections) are the rapidity with which individual and group opinions can be 
obtained and evaluated. Further, this includes a reduction of individual bias. It is 
known that personal bias arising during personal communication and group 
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consultation significantly influences surveys conducted in this manner. Evaluations are 
not based on interpersonal assessments of 'old hands' or the deployment of 'field 
agents' to provide qualitative data in terms of the measurement function. There is also 
a significant decrease in the amount of individual effort required when using the 
qualitative method to produce evaluations. A further function implied by this method 
is forecasting - assessments of this type provide a basis for the planning of safety 
programme requirements (Andrews, 1995:53). 
1.2.5.2 qualitative assessments 
The basic principle behind the behavioural response assessment questionnaires is to 
measure human behaviour and organisation at three management levels, as well as 
change in managerial perceptions and the effectiveness of safety programme elements. 
The assessment method is designed to minimise possible biasing effects in decision-
making due to dominant individuals, to enunciate biasing communications among 
members of management and to minimise group pressure towards conformity of 
opinion. The assessment procedure has three main elements: anonymous response, 
iteration and controlled feedback. The intention is therefore to achieve statistical 
definitions of the various groups of managers which is also, inter alia, an avenue of 
reducing group pressure for conformity. This furthermore ensures representation of all 
opinions. Anonymity, and the suppression of dominant individuals, is assured by 
means of the application of structured questionnaires. Extraneous communication 
between members of management and workers may, however, generate certain biases 
with regard to questionnaire completion. The above techniques are therefore 
considered to reduce bias due to known factors such as individual dominance or 
extraneous communication. These assumptions were justified when signifi6ant 
correlations were found between the groups of managers and workers assessed during 
questionnaire evaluation. 
Group assessment 
All three groups of managers - senior, middle and supervisory - questionnaires which 
are assessed. Contextually different questionnaires are evaluated from the worker level. 
Groups need to meet certain criteria before response assessments are conducted with 
personnel. The lateral safety programme must have been in operation for a minimum 
7 
period of 12-18 months and there must have been continuity of group leadership for the 
same time period. In other words, new managers or supervisors at worker 
representative levels would be disqualified from assessments. Questionnaires are 
assessed on an in-house basis, and evaluations led by the programme analyst. 
Oral confirmation 
In order to minimise possible biasing effects, interviews with front-line supervisors and 
managers are utilised as a means of verifying the data established by both assessment 
typologies. Interviews will comprise of assessments conducted with managers/ 
supervisors in the actual work situation. Put differently, interviews will not be carried 
out in isolation from colleagues or workers. 
1.2.5.3 quantitative assessments 
Introductory remarks 
The quantitative assessments conducted in this area primarily include measurements of 
compliance to programme elements. These are best described as safety audits. The 
purpose of safety audits is twofold. In the first place, they measure compliance to 
programme elements standards. In the second place, safety audits evaluate compliance 
to standards. The effectiveness of a safety programme can be gauged from this 
evaluation.. Safety audits are, inter alia, utilised to test qualitative assessments 
obtained by way of questionnaires. Put differently, changes in behavioural response to 
safety systems should be measurable as effective acts of compliance. Safety audits are 
used, therefore, to confirm response assessments obtained via questionnaires. 
Safety audits 
Safety audits represent a quantitative method for the macro-assessment of safety 
programme standards, based on expert and co-opted opinion. Current aucyt systems are 
based on the National Safety Associations audit index (NOSA) and Chamber of Mines 
International Safety Rating System (ISRS). Both systems are modifiable by experts to 
cater for the specific needs of industrial operations. Both NOSA and ISRS include 100 
page reports, and both systems are number orientated. NOSA auditors rate 76 
programme elements with substantial subdivisions that can affect a safety programme; 
ISRS auditors are limited to 20 programme elements but with greater subdivisions. 
Audit standards include primarily the measurement of managerial compliance and 
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physical conditions as reflected in programme elements. Both safety audit systems are 
weighted in terms of a star rating where 5 is superior and zero signifies unacceptable 
conditions. 
1.3 OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION 
1.3.1. Chapter by Chapter 
The dissertation concerns itself primarily with the identification of safety programme elements 
for 3-tier management structures and related measurements of programme effectiveness. The 
thesis commences with a discussion of the background to safety programme management 
(Chapter 2). Definitional and conceptual issues are covered, and the function of basic types of 
control is discussed. Chapter 2 also analyses human responses to control in a safety 
management system and provides an appraisal of some of the literature on the principles 
governing behavioural response as applied to actual situations occurring during task 
performance. 
Chapter 2 promotes the concept that behavioural response is primarily governed by specific 
key programme elements assigned to the various management levels of an organisation. The 
writer of the dissertation advances certain reasons for safety programme failures and proposes 
solutions. 
Chapter 3 introduces the framework of the first safety management system. The steering 
mechanism, conceptually critical to senior management, is evaluated in broad detail. Safety 
programme elements in a supportive role are developed to enhance: 
• Measurements of safety system effectiveness. 
• Co-ordination of safety programme. 
\ 
Measurements of compliance to programme elements are introduced. Furthermore, the effect 
of the safety system on the behavioural response of senior managers is evaluated. 
Chapter 4 repeats the framework of the previous chapter by discussing the function of a safety 
system designed specifically for the middle management level. The co-ordinating function of 
the key programme element is evaluated together with supporting programme elements. After 
9 
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implementation an analysis of the co-ordinating function will be carried out, and results 
discussed to determine the degree of effectiveness. The underlying causes for programme 
failures are reviewed. 
Chapter 5 concerns itself with the identification of areas of critical task performance at the 
supervisor and worker level. Critical linkages are established to measure and evaluate worker 
task performance. Similarly, an evaluation of programme effectiveness is carried out to 
determine the degree of behavioural response at this level. 
Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation by reviewing the aim of the investigation. 
10 
) 
2. CHAPTER TWO 
2.1 BACKGROUND TO SAFETY MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS 
2.1.1 Introductory 
Safety programme analysis involves the identification, measurement and incorporation 
into managerial procedures of actual and potential hazards which threaten the safety of 
industrial operations. In Chapter 1, it was shown that safety management programmes 
lack the controlling function to guide the behavioural response of persons. Hence, the 
process of analysis involves three phases which can be described as identification, 
measurement and management. The dissertation concentrates on the first two 
dimensions of the analytical process, and relates them to a model of safety management 
with steering mechanisms to guide behavioural response (as opposed to current safety 
management programmes which do not link steering mechanisms to management 
levels). 
In this chapter the required link between steering controls, management levels and 
behavioural response is examined in broad detail .. 
It needs to be stressed that manager/worker behavioural response lacks an 
epistemological basis in today's safety programmes. At the very least, this tends to 
limit participation by both managers and workers in safety programme activities, 
hence the persistence of active errors and resident accident pathogens. The primary 
objective of this dissertation is to implement the framework for a workable safety 
management system in nuclear power generation (Koeberg) which is transferable to 
other branches of industry or essential services. 
This chapter is divided into two sections: an analysis of safety management practices 
and background to current safety programme failures. Koeberg Nuclear Power Station 
is the research object. 
2.1.2 Influence Of Historical Events 
With the onset of the Industrial Revolution the first legislation (1802) was enacted to 
ensure minimum standards of heating, lighting, ventilation and work hours. It was, 
inter alia, primarily intended to stop the widespread abuse of the children from poor 
houses. As years went by, progressively restrictive laws were passed to deal with 
11 
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specific hazards. In Germany, Chancellor Bismarck introduced worker compensation 
(1880) to stem the rise of communism, as well as to respond to increasing 
dissatisfaction of workers labouring in hazardous workplace conditions. In Canada 
and the United States, events followed much the same course. Laws were passed to 
enforce safety standards and deploy factory inspectors. Notably, common law began to 
be altered in the worker's favour. A landmark study - the 'Pittsburgh Survey' -
exposed industry's poor safety record and laid the foundation for the National Safety 
Council of America. 
The evolution toward integration of safety into a professional management system 
experienced many significant advances in the late twentieth century. Certain landmark 
publications, such as W.G. Johnson The Management Oversight and Risk Tree (1973), 
F. Bird Practical Loss Control Leadership (1986) conceptually broadened the scope of 
safety management. Significantly, legislation in the U.S., Canada and Europe started 
incorporating the concept of safety management in their safety standards. The past two 
decades have seen the rapid spread of safety management systems in America, 
Australia and South Africa. Safety management systems have begun to include key 
programme elements designed to identify hazards and evaluate risks in terms of 
process safety. This evolution into a safety management system was prompted by an 
acknowledgement of three main shortcomings,perceived within traditional safety 
systems: 
(i) They addressed physical conditions and administrative requirements primarily. 
(ii) Managers and workers rarely participated in the setting of safety standards. 
(iii) Safety systems were not measurable and thus it was impossible to assess the 
potential of risk. 
The structure of safety systems in South Africa was strongly influenced by a US 
paradigm in the late 1960s. The empirical basis for this belief was provided by Frank 
Bird's analysis of 1 753 498 accidents reported by 287 companies, representing 21 
different industries. This laid the basis for the conviction that organisations as well as 
bodies needed to address specific principles of safety management. 
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Firstly, safety congresses in the US identified that current safety systems were limited 
in their controlling function, i.e. controls involved exclusively the object, not the 
manager or worker. To be effective, safety systems must enable managers and 
workers to participate in the controlling function. Secondly, managers and workers 
need to be in a position to identify and measure those risks which impact on worker 
and process safety. As later discussions will show, safety systems were indeed 
restructured, but the participation of management levels and the implementation of 
related steering mechanisms were not defined. 
This was recognised in SA by large mining houses such as De Beers Consolidated 
Mines and Anglo American Corporation. In a paper presented in May 1990, H 
Strohbach, Group Safety Engineer of Anglo American Corporation, stated 
categorically that 'senior managers' commitment is essential to safety programme 
effectiveness'. Further, mining management circles recognised early the importance of 
steering mechanisms. De Beers Consolidated Mines, for example, utilised safety co-
ordinating committees as early as 1976. The function of co-ordinating committees was 
to provide a steering mechanism for the management of safety systems. The role of 
steering mechanisms was, however, not recognised in national or US safety 
programmes. As a result, safety audits carried out in mining and general industry did 
not include steering mechanisms as an item of measurement. This in turn meant that 
safety programmes in the SA context largely overlooked steering mechanisms, thereby 
limiting managerial involvement nationwide. 
This dissertation seeks to link the recurring failure of safety systems in a South African 
and international context to the omission of steering controls in safety management 
systems. The recently promulgated Occupational Health and Safety Act ( 1993) 
provides for legal compliance by employers. However, this Act does not provide 
guidance with regard to safety management systems. A further source of concern is that 
figures released by the SA Department of Labour (1996) show an increase in accident 
frequency rates in the SA industrial sector. 
2.1.3 Resource Limitations 
Current publications in the field do not address the function of managerial levels in 
safety programmes, nor are distinctions made with regard to primary and secondary 
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controlling functions of programme elements. Epistemologically therefore, the above 
concepts could not be reviewed by consulting existing literature. Current writers on 
safety management systems conceptually exclude steering controls and behavioural 
response elements; consequently the author was compelled to draw on own and 
peripheral materials. Only three researchers who had based their analyses on the 
exposition of behavioural response and steering mechanisms (JT Reason, 1991, 1997; 
WH Newman, 1975; F Bird, 1985) supplied concepts for the main hypotheses. Not 
one of these viewpoints, however, incorporates the key principles of steering controls 
and behavioural response in safety management systems. 
2.1.4 Agenda for Future Research 
Despite the fact that South Africa hosts some of the world's largest (and deepest) 
mining operations, the concept of safety management is regrettably not taught here at 
tertiary level. It is strongly recommended that future curricula at the universities of 
Cape Town, Pretoria and Witwatersrand introduce students to the principles of safety 
management. Safety professionals note with dismay that engineering and business 
management graduates often fail to give direction and control to safety programmes 
when in managerial positions. This is, in turn, attributed to the existing void in 
university curricula. 
After a preliminary discussion of the linkages between steering controls, management 
levels and behavioural response, the next section of this chapter investigates the impact 
of these concepts on safety management in more detail. 
2.2 CONCEPTUAL AND DEFINITIONAL DETAIL 
2.2.1 Basic Types of Control 
2.2.1.1 defining steering controls 
Steering controls constitute one of the basic phases of managing and always include 
evaluation and feedback. They have been defined by Newman as 'providing a 
mechanism for remedial action while the actual results are still being shaped' (1975:7). 
Newman particularly stresses the positive effect of steering controls on the behavioural 
response of persons. He attributes this to the design elements of steering controls 
which provide effective measurement and evaluation mechanisms, which in turn lead 
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to high levels of personal involvement in the control cycle. This analytical distinction 
underlines the fact that behavioural response is far more important than the mechanics 
of a control. Significantly, current safety management programmes do not assign 
steering controls to the various organisational levels of management (ISRS, NOSA 
Safety Programmes, 1998). This dissertation seeks to establish steering controls as the 
missing link that guides behavioural response during person - machine interactions 
Further, this dissertation seeks to attribute the persistence of latent conditions and 
active errors in industrial operations to absent or defective steering mechanisms . 
An alternative definition which is not as precise as Newman's is that of F Bird 
(1986:47). Bird understands the concept of steering controls loosely as a management 
tool to devise safety programme standards. He does not, however, link steering 
mechanisms to behavioural response; the usage of steering controls is limited to 
specific controlling functions required by a safety programme. 
2.2.1.2 role of steering controls 
The persistence of latent conditions and active failures in hazardous technologies today 
is attributed to two causative factors: 
(i) failure to identify resident accident pathogens and hazards in operational 
processes, 
(ii) failure to evaluate existing known hazards effectively. 
Reason (1997: 10) demonstrates the validity of this hypothesis with his 'Swiss cheese' 
accident causation model. Like resident pathogens in the human body, latent 
conditions - such as poor design, gaps in supervision or maintenance failures - may be 
present for many years before they combine with local circumstances and active errors 
to produce an accident. Despite safety programmes currently in operation, major 
accidents in organisations point to failures in managerial control - such as strategic and 
top-level decisions by organisational managers. The impact of these decisions spreads 
throughout the organisation like the holes in a Swiss cheese, creating conditions where 
errors can occur. 
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Upon analysis of accident causative data, it is evident that precursors of accidents (i.e. 
near-miss incidents) as well as active failures were not timeously identified. Where 
precursors were identified, a deficient evaluatory mechanism failed to signal 
impending disaster to the organisation. This is confirmed by accident studies 
conducted by both Reason (1991:173) and Bird (1986:57). It follows that the 
organisation's basic controlling function failed to recognise and evaluate the threat 
posed by a particular condition or process. 
Upon closer examination, the failure to (a) identify hazards and (b) evaluate hazards 
leads to the conclusion that steering controls were not effectively utilised. This 
hypothesis is only indirectly confirmed by existing literature ( see Reason, 1991 ). 
Hence, the writer's intention to show that steering mechanisms, linked to the 
organisational management levels, will facilitate the identification and measurement of 
resident accident pathogens and active failures. 
For example, the steering mechanism assigned to the senior management level is to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the organisation's (Koeberg's) safety programme, whilst 
assisting in the identification of latent conditions and causative factors of accidents. 
Similarly, middle managers are required to evaluate safety programme compliance 
with supervisors, with particular emphasis on the evaluation of active failures during 
operational processes. Finally, supervisors are required to measure compliance to 
actual task procedures plus examine areas of task performances for the existence of 
hazards. 
The steering mechanisms described above will be reflected in specific safety 
programme elements assigned to managers. Typical examples will be task 
observations conducted by supervisors, hazard identifications evaluated jointly by 
supervisors and middle managers, and safety programme effectiveness evaluated 
jointly by senior and middle managers. The application of steering controls will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
The design elements of steering controls - identification, measurement and evaluation 
- are known to facilitate personal involvement in the control cycle. This Newman 
attributes to a beneficial feature of steering controls: they provide early evaluation 
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which enables timeous control adjustments to be made. Operational personnel thus 
have the distinct advantage of identifying a problem area ( or hazard), measuring the 
magnitude of the problem or hazard, and evaluating the process necessary to resolve 
the problem. Moreover, managers or operational personnel are given an opportunity 
for personal involvement in the control cycle. In this way they are able to influence the 
outcome by drawing on their resources of experience, training and creativity. 
In view of the absence of literature on steering controls in a safety context, it seems 
appropriate to review the papers of two researchers (Newman, 1975; Bird, 1986) who 
have - to greater or lesser extent - integrated steering mechanisms into control cycles. 
2.2.1.3 William Newman 
WH Newman in Constructive Control, although not writing from a safety standpoint, 
conceptually integrates into a management system three basic types of control, i.e. 
steering, yes-no and post-action controls (1975:6). Newman views steering controls, 
however, as indispensable for the effective evaluation of a control cycle. Most 
importantly, he links the evaluatory mechanism of steering controls to effective 
behavioural response. The scientific method adopted by Newman for his study allows 
his hypothesis to be tested according to the principles of case studies, projects and 
programs. He therefore outlines a conceptual model of reality on which safety control 
systems can be based. 
Newman's 'bottom line' is essentially this: managerial control is effective only when it 
guides someone's behaviour. Behaviour, not measurements and reports, is the essence 
of control. 
This is in conflict with Bird and Germain who have adopted a single basic control 
activity for the identification and measurement of safety systems. Nor is this single 
control activity in the form of steering controls consistently applied in the framework 
which governs their safety systems. The structure of certain programme elements 
cannot be subjected to steering mechanisms, especially where control actions are 
complete, and results measured and compared to a standard. For example, a procedure 
detailing the execution of a critical task will not incorporate a mechanism for the 
evaluation of its own effectiveness. 
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2.2.1.4 Frank Bird and George Germain 
Bird and Germain in Practical Loss Control Leadership (1985) discuss the conceptual 
and definitional aspect of safety programme elements in great detail. They contend 
(correctly) that management control of safety systems is based on the identification and 
measurement of programme elements. The authors rely on the motivational medium 
of management and leadership to ensure compliance with the standards set by safety 
programme elements. This approach, however, does not measure the behavioural 
response of persons to programme elements which are an integral part of safety 
systems. 
The authors outline conceptually a safety management programme of reality, but 
programme elements are not identified in terms of managerial programme or 
controlling function. Their paper identifies the source of a rating process - the 
principle of the 'critical few' which can be utilised for hazard evaluations and may 
therefore be called scientific. It should be noted, however, that this principle cannot be 
utilised for steering control purposes. Rather, the authors describe the principle as 
useful for the implementation of a general safety programme (Bird, 1985 :46). 
Further, their functional assessment on management control does not identify the three 
main groupings of basic types of control - namely steering, yes-no and post-action 
controls. Their scheme for the analysis of programme elements is confined to the 
integration of steering controls only. It is the author's contention that the basic 
controls governing a safety system are variable and not confined to one taxonomy. 
Their work must be credited, however, for providing a workable safety system, with 
identified safety programme standards, to the international industry. 
Since the influence of steering controls on behavioural response is a key element of 
this dissertation, an exploration of behavioural response in the context of organisational 
environments is imperative. 
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2.3 ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR 
2.3.1 Organisational Influences on Behavioural Response 
2.3.1.1 models 
As briefly discussed in Chapter 1, 'human error' is one of a long-established list of so-
called 'causes' often used by the press and accident investigators. But 'human error' is 
mostly a consequence, not a cause. In Reason's words, errors are 'shaped and 
provoked by upstream workplace and organisation factors' (1997:126). Typical error-
inducing agencies are personal, task-related, situational and organisational factors. The 
often repeated statistic that human error is implicated in 80-95 per cent of all events 
generally leads to the conclusion that individual human inadequacies and errant actions 
are the principal causes of all accidents. Yet the fact remains that workplaces and 
organisations are easier to manage than the minds of individual workers. And, despite 
popular opinion, these individual minds are not among the primary causes of accidents 
identified by most writers on the subject. It is easier to change the conditions under 
which people work than to effect changes to human condition. In short, the solutions 
to most human performance problems are technical rather than psychological. 
This dissertation seeks to resolve these apparent conflicts by recognising that steering 
controls can provide three distinct models. These important distinctions were first 
made in 1990 at a Safety and Reliability Society Symposium by Deborah Lucas who 
outlined the three concepts necessary to identify error producing conditions in 
operational processes. The person model identifies conditions that influence the 
choice between safe and unsafe behaviour. The engineering model views human 
error as a result of system designers failing to tailor the technical system appropriately 
to the cognitive strengths and weaknesses of its human controllers. The 
organisational model views human error as a result of fallible board decisions and 
managerial policy. Inappropriate human behaviour is largely determined by the 
existence of latent (unsafe) conditions caused by flawed decision-making processes in 
the management hierarchy. A typical example can be found in the accident scenario of 
the 'Herald of Free Enterprise', where fallible board decisions and unresolved line 
management problems caused the sinking of a passenger ferry. 
The frameworks of current safety programmes largely exclude the above three 
approaches to safety management. Consequently, problems are experienced in terms 
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of behavioural response which seemingly persist in all types of industry eg mining, 
manufacturing, maritime and aerospace. The guidelines of existing safety programmes 
are limited in their application of the above three models, particularly in the evaluation 
of conditions that would impact on the behavioural response of persons. Notably, the 
organisational model, with its emphasis on the evaluation of hierarchical decision 
making and latent system errors, is almost entirely neglected. Again, it must be 
stressed that the root cause of major accidents is attributable to managerial processes 
which fail to evaluate the safety of operational processes. Hence, human - machine 
mismatches and active errors continue to stifle appropriate behavioural response. This 
dissertation seeks to employ the three models for the purposes of controlling latent 
conditions and active errors, always operating from the premise that human errors are 
the symptoms of latent conditions in the system at large. 
Another premise is that effective behavioural response depends on the basic controlling 
function provided by a safety management system. This factor was isolated during the 
analyses of major accidents, notable by authors such as Newman, Reason and Bird. As 
stated above, this dissertation will employ steering controls to incorporate the above 
distinct models - the person model, the engineering model and the organisational 
model - in safety management. The basic controlling functions of these models 
constitute, for the purpose of this dissertation, the key principle for influencing the 
behavioural response of persons. 
Much of the discussion in the following chapters will focus on the design of effective 
steering controls to guide the behavioural response of persons. A further objective of 
this dissertation is the evaluation of concepts such as leadership, informal organisation, 
communication, decision making and their impact on behavioural response. According 
to Hersey and Blanchard, problems associated with the management of organisational 
behaviour indicate a deficient provision of organisational guidelines, notably in the 
area of controlling (1977: 127-129). Although never attempted before in safety 
management, steering mechanisms will be employed to guide managers in the areas of 
leadership, informal organisation and the like. 
Two new safety management concepts have emerged from the above discussion: 
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(i) the application of steering controls to provide three distinct management 
models, 
(ii) the application of steering controls to guide the management of organisational 
behaviour. 
Neither of these two concepts has been researched previously. 
Overview of Four Perspectives 
The following four authors' analyses of organisational behaviour are limited in terms 
of safety management, but are conceptually important for behavioural response 
assessment methodologies discussed in the latter part of this chapter, as well as in 
chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
2.3.2.1 Felix Nigro 
One of the early analyses of human behaviour and organisation, Nigro (1965) discusses 
the conceptual and definitional positions of leadership, informal organisation, 
communication, decision-making and controlling. Nigro correctly contends that 
leadership styles are subject to forces in the situation, a contention repeatedly 
confirmed in the analysis of this dissertation. Proceeding to the area of informal 
organisation, Nigro sketches the characteristics of small groups and their related 
influence on the organisation in great detail, but aspects of non-deliberate departures 
from the formal organisation plan are not clearly portrayed (1965:153) Nigro sketches 
primarily the social interaction of work and friendship groups, but does not identify 
specific processes which induce non-deliberate departures from the formal plan. This 
aspect, of great significance to the behavioural response required for safety systems, is 
effectively described by Simon, Smithburg and Thompson in The Administrative 
Process and Democratic Theory (1970: 193). 
Nigro distinguishes between three types of communication - lateral, downward and 
upward. Of particular significance is his assessment of lateral communication which 
he describes as being 'of great importance in assuring the co-ordination of 
organisational objectives' ( 1965: 193 ). 
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Similarly, Nigro stresses that effective decision making is based on managers obtaining 
'lateral clearances' by consulting with their counterparts. Extrapolating to safety 
systems management, lateral clearances of this type are essential for implementing 
safety policy in an organisation. Case studies in the SA context strongly suggest that 
the incidence of serious accidents is attributable to lack of effective policy decisions 
(See 'Vaal Reefs locomotive' and Cape Town 'container handling incident', courtesy 
Dept of Labour, 1996). 
A typical definition of controlling, based on the medium of inspections and audits, is 
defined by Nigro. He contends that most management control systems include two 
standard procedures: written reports and inspections. It is acknowledged that the 
planned inspection is essential to an effective controlling function (Bird, 1985: 121 ). 
Nigro does not, however, identify the elements required for the design of a control 
cycle, and notably excludes evaluation and feedback which are essential to managerial 
control (Newman, 1975:25). Without the evaluatory process of a steering mechanism, 
it seems unlikely that Nigro's controlling function would favourably impact on human 
behaviour. 
2.3.2.2 Simon, Smithburg and Thompson 
Smithburg and Thompson (1970) discuss the character of organisational influences in 
more detail. They distinguish between the pattern of behaviours that is deliberately 
and legitimately planned and the actual pattern of behaviours that depart slightly or 
widely from the formal plan of organisation. As such, the incompleteness of the 
formal organisation is sketched, with a gradual development into patterns of behaviour 
which supplement or contradict its formal plan. Particularly noteworthy is their 
assessment that non-deliberate departures from the formal organisation plans are occur 
frequently and are as significant as deliberate departures. This contention is 
particularly illuminating in the context of safety system analysis, as the nature of the 
informal organisations determines to a large extent the degree of behavioural response. 
Further, studies into safety system failures clearly indicate a prevalent pattern of non-
deliberate departures from the formal organisation plan. Where the plan conflicts with 
deep-seated habits or attitudes it may be forgotten or ignored, without deliberate intent 
- for example, where the meaning of elaborate paperwork processes is not apparent to 
employees (Simon et al. 1970: 193). Safety systems have been known to fail when 
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design factors do not take cognisance of excessive plan complexity or of controls that 
require elaborate response or interfere with existing command structures (Reason, 
1997: 134). The authors indicate that where existing channels do not facilitate goal 
achievement, new or informal channels are employed to bypass or supplement the 
formal ones. 
Nevertheless, the authors caution against a simplistic view about influences that 
determine the behaviour of organisation members. They rightly state that issues of 
legitimacy or authorisation of formal plans that affect behaviour are only a few among 
numerous influences, organisational and non-organisational, that determine the 
behaviour of organisation members. 
This dissertation intends to demonstrate, however, that the steering controls utilised by 
the various management levels of an organisation will ultimately determine the 
effectiveness of behavioural response. This is the topic of our next discussion. As far 
as could be ascertained, papers do not exist on this hypothesis. Newman (1975:43) 
does demonstrate, however, the favourable linkage between steering controls and 
human response. 
2.4 BEHAVIOURAL RESPONSE GOVERNANCES 
2.4.1 Controlling Factors 
2.4.1.1 management levels 
Current safety programmes do not assign specific controlling functions to the various 
managerial levels of an organisation. Consequently, managerial input with regard to 
the safety of operational processes is limited. More importantly, the lack of basic 
controls prevent evaluation and feedback to the managers concerned. Typical 
examples of international safety programmes which fail to assign specific controlling 
functions to management levels are (a) National Occupational Safety Association 
(NOSA), (b) ISRS (USA), (c) ROSPA (UK). It is appropriate to recall here that 
managerial failure has been established as the root cause of all major accidents 
(Reason, 1991:251). 
From the causal analyses of major accidents a critical factor emerges: the management 
hierarchy is implicated in accident causation (Reason, 1991: 188). It is furthermore 
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evident that existing safety programmes do not specify the type of managerial 
involvement necessary. Put differently, managers are not assigned specific actions to 
monitor and evaluate safety programme effectiveness. Consequently, the entire 
management hierarchy of organisations has limited opportunity to influence decisions 
and evaluate the safety of operational procedures. Nor, for that matter, does a 
mechanism exist which continuously measures compliance to existing safety 
programme standards. 
This dissertation, therefore, seeks to provide a framework which will assign specific 
controlling functions to the various management levels of an organisation. 
Accordingly, a safety programme will be employed which will address the identified 
needs of senior, middle and supervisory management. 
(i) Evaluation of operational processes 
Analyses of accident scenarios indicate a deficient evaluation of causative factors. 
Hence a controlling function is required at every management level to evaluate 
operational processes for latent conditions and active errors. The evaluatory process of 
steering controls provides such a mechanism for every management level on a 
continuous basis. 
(ii) Measuring compliance to operational safety standards 
In view of active errors committed by operational staff, measurements are required to 
determine the degree of compliance to prescribed safety standards. In the past, such 
measurements were not extended to all management levels of an organisation. 
Consequently, the controlling function for measuring behavioural response - for 
example, task observations - was not carried out, making it impossible for managers to 
evaluate the effectiveness of behavioural responses. 
Both the above controlling functions (i.e. evaluation of operational processes and 
measuring compliance to operational safety standards) are briefly discussed in the . 
context of managerial levels applicable. As stated previously, all analyses in the 
context of this dissertation will be carried out at Koeberg Nuclear Power Station. 
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Senior Management Level 
Three researchers who have implicated the senior management teams of organisations 
in accident causation are J Noyes, N Stanton (1997:109) and J Reason (1991:202). 
They have attributed accidents to fallible decisions taken by top-level plant and 
corporate managers. It is not so much a question of allocating blame, but rather of 
recognising the constraints facing senior managers during decision-making. Reason 
sketches two dilemmas that face executive leadership in terms of safety management. 
In the first place, resources directed at safety are not measurable in terms of cost 
benefit analyses (at least in the short term) and there is thus no 'certainty of outcome'. 
This is due to the stochastic, or random, elements in accident causation. Secondly, 
there is a problem regarding the nature of feedback - put simply, 'production feedback 
speaks louder than safety feedback'. Further, the feedback on safety problems is often 
filtered as subordinate managers also have 'interests to protect'. 
This dissertation seeks to address these problem areas by providing an evaluatory 
mechanism for ensuring effective interaction between line managers. For this purpose 
a safety steering committee, staffed by the Power Station Manager and Heads of 
Department, will be utilised. The evaluatory function or steering mechanism assigned 
to this committee will be utilised to measure senior as well as subordinate manager's 
compliance to safety programme standards. This will include analyses of incidents 
with major loss potential, as well as of the trends in accident patterns, and co-
ordination of safety programmes at middle management levels. 
Interestingly, organisations which have experienced high accident rates are also 
experiencing problems with their safety steering committee functions. This is apparent 
when the minutes of these committees are examined and it is discovered that the 
evaluatory mechanism required to assess programme effectiveness is almost entirely 
lacking. Agendas of safety steering committees mostly do not require the mandatory 
evaluation of operational processes. 
Further, the steering mechanism assigned to the senior management level incorporates 
the three safety management models discussed above - the organisational, engineering 




Middle Management Level 
The steering mechanism assigned to middle management will focus on the evaluation 
of programme effectiveness at group level. For this purpose a safety committee is 
utilised with the following functions: 
(i) identification of latent conditions and active errors in the managers' area of 
accountability, 
(ii) the degree of procedural compliance demonstrated by operational personnel. 
Similarly, the three management models (organisational, engineering and person 
models), are integrated into the steering mechanism assigned to middle managers. 
Again, their primary function is to facilitate the identification of human error and 
precursors of accidents. The causal factors of the latter are subsequently evaluated at 
safety committee level. 
Supervisory/Operative/Worker Level 
The steering mechanism assigned to this level focuses primarily on the identification of 
active errors made during task performances/operational procedures. Active errors 
committed are evaluated by supervisory management to determine the root causes that 
led to failures in terms of behavioural response. Causative factors that pinpoint active 
errors are finally evaluated at group safety committee level. We can see from the 
above that there is a distinct application of steering controls in this 3-tier management 
structure. Again, the three management models - person, engineering and 
organisational - are integrated into the specific steering activities required for the 
supervisory management level. 
As this dissertation intends to demonstrate that managerial steering mechanisms play a 
critical role during the identification and evaluation of accident precursors, Reason's 
analysis of managerial implication in accident causation is reviewed. 
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2.4.1.2 JT Reason 
This author, noted for his comprehensive review and documentation of major disasters 
such as Bhopal, Challenger, Chernobyl, Zeebrugge and King's Cross, has developed a 
model which outlines the sequence of events necessary for the occurrence of an 
accident. In the postulated 'dynamics of accident causation' model, Reason describes 
a number of latent and active failures which produce an accident. Extrapolating both 
latent and active failures to actual accident scenarios, the efficacy of Reason's accident 
causation model can readily be established. 
What distinguishes Reason's accident causation model from those of other authors 
(Bird, Kuhlmann, Heinrich) is his identification of a given sequence of managerial 
factors which result in events leading to an accident. Reason postulates fallible board 
decisions and policy of senior management as a primary precursor in an accident 
sequence. A further precursor is that of unresolved problems at line management 
level. This effectively implies that management in general fails to identify and 
evaluate latent conditions and active errors timeously. In contrast, Bird's accident 
causation model identifies generic management barriers, but does not specify the role 
of the various management levels in his accident causation model. Significantly, 
Reason's accident causation concept is the only model thus far which attempts to 
define specific failures on the part of management. 
Reason does not identify lack of steering mechanisms as a problem area, but strongly 
advocates Lucas's three safety management models for the identification of precursors 
of accidents. The author of this dissertation contends however, that the mechanism of 
steering controls incorporates the three management models as an effective controlling 
function. Interestingly, to note that Reason's accident causation model can be 
effectively applied to analyse the causes of every major disaster that has occurred in the 
SA context, notably also the Merriespruit (1994) and Vaal Reefs (1995) incidents. 
This concludes the systemic review of the factors that are likely to influence the 
behavioural response of operational staff. The effectiveness of key elements such as 
steering controls linked to management levels will be tested and evaluated in Chapters 
3, 4 and 5. The management structure at Koeberg Nuclear Power Station will be 
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utilised to test the effectiveness of steering controls. There follows a brief review of 
Koeberg's operational aspects and problems experienced with safety management 
programmes at the plant. 
2.5 PLACE OF RESEARCH 
2.5.1 Koeberg: Operational Abstract 
The research for this dissertation was carried out between 1993 - 1998 in one of 
Eskom's Strategic Business Units, namely Koeberg Nuclear Power Station. Problems 
were experienced with behavioural response towards the conventional safety 
programme then in place and it was apparent that a different approach was warranted. 
Koeberg had at that stage obtained a 5 star rating but this had not resolved the 
punctuated recurrence of active errors. Consequently a line management-driven safety 
programme was proposed by the author of this dissertation during the latter part of 
1993. 
2.5.1.1 historical background 
The construction of a commercial nuclear power plant on SA soil was first mooted 
during the late sixties, during an era of a world-wide tendency to 'to nuclear', primarily 
for strategic and political reasons. Coupled to the fact that Safari of Pelindaba had 
become operational, the availability of cheap uranium (with assured large reserves) in 
South Africa and Namibia (then South West Africa) confirmed the feasibility study 
carried out during 1972/3. South Africa at that stage did not possess the technical 
means to construct large commercial nuclear power plants. A turnkey contract was 
awarded to the multinational corporation Electricite de France (EdF) for the 
construction of a twin-unit N-plant capable of generating close to 2000 megawatt. 
2.5.1.2 operational and legal 
Current manpower complement for the day to day running of the station stands at 
roughly one thousand persons employed by Koeberg. During general equipment and 
refuelling outages this figure can increase to 1400, mainly through the addition of 
contractual staff for general and specialised functions of outage work. The 
organisational structure reflects nuclear engineering, maintenance, operating, 
manpower and nuclear safety assurance functions. Nuclear Power Generation in South 
Africa is governed by the Council for Nuclear safety (CNS), an umbrella organisation 
28 
for the SA nuclear industry with full-time staff at Koeberg. The Occupational Health 
and Safety Act, promulgated in 1993, applies to Koeberg in its entirety, regulating 
electrical, mechanical and substance exposures in the workplace. Requirements of the 
Act are integrated into the safety programme. Koeberg follows Eskom policy by way 
of corporate hierarchy, with the Power Station Manager reporting directly to the 
Executive Director, Generation. This implies that Koeberg, like any of the other fossil 
power stations in the Generation enclave, is subject to Eskom strategy. Koeberg's 
chain of command follows the classical pattern of Chief Executive Officer (Power 
Station Manager) presiding over a 3-tier organisational structure which comprises of 
senior, middle and supervisory management levels. Participative structures include 
liaison with registered trade unions. 
2.5.1.3 genesis of safety programme 
Koeberg adopted the safety programme of the National Occupational Safety 
Association (NOSA) during 1986. Three objectives were to be met: (i) uniform safety 
standard to regulate premises and housekeeping, (ii) identification and correction of 
conditions posing hazards to worker safety, and (iii) legal compliance. Koeberg 
progressed from an initial 3-star rating (the NOSA system employs a star grading 
process for measurements of compliance) in 1988 to a 5-star rating in 1991. 
However, the basis for sustained managerial commitment to the programme remained 
in question. This was reflected in the regular occurrence of accidents with considerable 
loss potential despite the achievement of a 5 star rating. Proposals made by the author 
resulted in the formation of a safety steering committee in 1993. The primary function 
of this committee was to ensure management involvement in safety programme 
activities, including the evaluation of safety programme effectiveness at Koeberg. The 
committee was empowered to determine safety policy at Koeberg and to act on the 
requirements arising from programme activities. 
The latter part of 1993 saw the implementation of a 3-tier management safety 
programme. A middle bi-directional approach was utilised during safety programme 
co-ordination. This implied that programme elements for both the senior and 
supervisory management levels were simultaneously implemented. The programme 
element standards for the middle management level saw implementation only towards 
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the end of 1994. This approach was adopted to ensure immediate involvement by 
supervisors and workers and to solicit their commitment. Further, senior management 
was then placed to evaluate programme effectiveness at the person - machine interface. 
The safety programme was implemented under the leadership of middle managers in 
their respective groups and sections. Feedback indicated that effective programme 
leadership by middle managers was evident in groups with high programme acceptance 
- resulting in lower injury frequency rates. The author of this dissertation served as 
facilitator during group sessions of programme implementation. 
Surveys were conducted by the author to assess safety programme effectiveness during 
1994-1998. Questionnaires were submitted on an anonymous basis to managers, 
supervisors and workers to gauge the degree of behavioural response to the revised 
programme standards. KEYPOINT: it is of interest to note that groups with high 
programme acceptance consistently produced lower accident frequency rates than their 
counterparts displaying low or indifferent programme acceptance. This factor was 
repeatedly borne out during safety audits conducted by 'ombudsman' type groups 
measuring compliance to safety standards. 
2.5.2 Testing of a New Concept 
The remainder of this paper will analyse the effect of steering mechanisms on the 
behavioural response of operational staff Chapters 3, 4 and 5 will evaluate this 
concept at the senior, middle and supervisory management levels respectively. 
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3. CHAPTER THREE: METHODS, MODELS FOR IDENTIFICATION AND 
MEASUREMENT AT SENIOR MANAGEMENT LEVEL 
3.1 IDENTIFICATION - INTRODUCTORY 
Identification of appropriate controls has remained a central concern for senior managers in 
terms of accident causation. As discussed in Chapter 2, managerial failure is cited as one of 
the root causes of all major accidents (Reason, 1997: 173). Significantly, senior management 
levels are implicated for reasons of fallible board decisions and general inadequacy of safety 
policy (Noyes & Stanton, 1997: 109). 
Hence, this dissertation seeks to assign specific controls to the senior management level, 
namely regular safety evaluations of organisational processes and assessments of safety 
programme effectiveness. 
Intended therefore, is the identification of resident accident pathogens in operational processes. 
For this purpose, specific programme elements are assigned to senior managers to control the 
accident potential. These safety programme elements will focus primarily on the evaluation of 
operational processes in terms of safety standards and compliance. To this end, steering 
controls will be utilised for the evaluation of the organisation's operational processes at the 
senior management level. 
3.1.1 Function of steering controls 
The function of steering controls lies in the continuous evaluation of Koeberg' s safety 
programme. The intention is to provide senior managers with a steering mechanism 
for the identification of resident accident pathogens in operational processes and for 
continuous evaluation of operational processes throughout the organisation. This will 
require measurements of safety programme compliance at middle and supervisory 
management levels in order to determine programme effectiveness. 
The mechanism utilised for this purpose will comprise a safety steering committee 
operational at the senior management level ( to evaluate the organisation's safety 
programme) and support programme elements (to assist senior managers in the 
evaluation of programme effectiveness). 
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The safety steering committee, in terms of staffing representation, will require the 
mandatory participation of executive leadership, i.e. Power Station Manager and Heads 
of Department. The evaluatory mechanism of the safety steering committee will require 
review of incidents with major loss potential and latent conditions identified. Further, 
senior managers are required to carry out specific measurements of compliance 
stipulated by the support programme elements. For example, the evaluatory 
mechanism of these programme elements requires inspections, risk assessments and 
co-ordination of safety programmes at middle element levels. 
The results or findings arising from these assessments are subsequently tabled at safety 
steering committee meetings and evaluated. Where measurements indicate 
compromised or inadequate compliance to programme elements, analyses are 
conducted to identify the root causes which impede behavioural response. Corrective 
actions may include revision of the support programme element standards which may 
render operator compliance difficult, revision of training or addressing managerial 
commitment and motivational factors. The specific functions of the steering 
mechanism, i.e. safety steering committee and support programme elements, are 
discussed below. 
3.2 SAFETY STEERING COMMITTEE 
From the above analysis of steering controls, the strategic importance of a safety steering 
mechanism can be deduced. The analysis identifies conceptually the facilitatory role of the 
steering committee in terms of effective leadership and other factors of organisational 
behaviour, including informal organisation, communication and decision-making. It is the 
author's intent, in view of managerial failure as the primary cause of industrial accidents 
(confirmed by Bird, Reason, Stanton, Noyes), to affirm the pre-eminence of this strategic 
programme element. 
The agenda of the safety steering committee intended to facilitate the following processes: (i) 
identifying safety policy for the organisation, (ii) continuous development of safety 
programme elements for all management levels, (iii) measuring compliance to safety 
programme elements, (iv) evaluating the organisation's safety programme on a continuous 
basis. A participative approach would be required for the steering committee process. It was 
recognised that senior managers, special interest groups, programme analysts and worker 
representatives were required to participate if all levels of the organisation were to be reached. 
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The structure of the steering committee had to make provision for: (i) avoiding group 'hi-jack', 
(ii) opening and maintaining channels of communication. 
3.2.1. Groupthink 
The influence over thought processes by certain members of a group can pose a threat 
in terms of effective decision making. This aspect is particularly highlighted by the 
analysis of events that led to 'Pearl Harbour' and 'Bay of Pigs' (Lau & Jelinek, 1985: 
24). More recently, the sinking of the 'Herald of Free Enterprise' has been attributed 
by Justice Sheen, Department of Transport UK, to a pervasive group norm which 
persistently failed to recognise resident accident pathogens. This type of managerial 
failure in a large corporation is also discussed by Reason (1991:232) when analysing 
the accidents of Chernobyl and space shuttle 'Challenger'. 
Accordingly, the agenda of the safety steering was designed to counteract group norms. 
Firstly, the required participation by all committee members intended to counteract the 
reluctance of low-status members - i.e. union representatives, accident investigation 
respondees - to reveal potentially incriminating information to hierarchical 
supervisors. Further, a participative approach would ensure that low-status members 
initiated interaction as well, for example by putting proposals forward on how to 
prevent the causation of accidents. These aspects are correctly illustrated by Lau and 
Jelinek (1984:249) in their exposition of group communication. Third, in order to 
prevent the safety programme from being 'hi-jacked' by senior group members, 
specific 'frontline' programme elements (such as accident investigations and 
inspections) which require evaluation by senior managers, were included. This factor 
is particularly relevant during accident investigations where members will tend to 
rationalise the actual hazard away. As Robbins argues: 'No matter how strongly the 
evidence may contradict their basic assumptions, committee members behave so as to 
reinforce these assumptions' ( 1996: 3 22). 
It follows that inappropriate groupthink can compromise safety standards which in tum 
impacts on the behavioural response of persons. Indeed, groupthink was responsible for 
the unpreparedness of 'Pearl Harbour' and 'Herald of Free Enterprise' (Reason, 
1991:193; Lau & Jelinek, 1984:249). 
33 
incidents where precursors pointed to latent failures and active errors, i.e. Challenger, 
Zeebrugge and Three Mile Island. 
As a consequence of these latent and active factors, decisions were taken which in 
hindsight - the intention here is to avoid being a retrospective observer and slip into a 
censorious frame of mind - raise questions as to: (i) quality of causative data made 
available to senior managers; (ii) involvement of the organisational hierarchy in 
accident/incident investigation; (iii) evaluation of accident and 'near miss incident' 
causative data and resultant prescriptions for remedial actions. Bearing in mind how 
difficult it is to identify with any certainty the root causes of a specific incident, this 
dissertation will employ two therapeutic measures. The first entails the involvement of 
supervisors, middle and senior management in accident/incident investigation. The 
second prescribes the evaluation of accident causative data (including actual 
presentations by the respective subordinate managers at steering committee level ) and 
an assessment of how effective remedial actions at safety steering committee level have 
been. 
3.3.2 Risk analyses - baseline 
A primary causative factor diagnosed in all major accidents - Zeebrugge, Bophal 
(India), Kinross (SA) Vaal Reefs (SA), Challenger - are latent and active errors not 
timeously identified (Reason, 1994:188-94; Noyes & Stanton, 1997:111). 
Conclusively, accident occurrences in the SA industrial sectors, as well as in-house 
analyses of incidents indicate that precursors of accidents are not identified prior to 
occurrence (see Department of Labour Statistics, 1996). By implication, if latent 
hazards are not identified and evaluated, existing resident accident pathogens are 
maintained. This is extremely unfortunate. In contrast to such widespread incidences 
of laxity, the multinational 'Electricite de Francaise' corporation has developed 
hazard-based assessments for their nuclear power plants to analyse risks threatening 
process safety on both nuclear and conventional islands. This foresight has led to a 
reduction in accident frequency rates. 
Although these risk analyses exclude the identification of design-based errors, their 
effectiveness has been tested at Koeberg Nuclear Power Station. The risk analysis at 
Koeberg was expanded to include latent condition analysis for integration into the 
business of safety steering committees. Primarily, risk analyses facilitate the control of 
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process safety, for example through a review of processes and engineering design, or 
through adaptive strategies intended to treat, tolerate, terminate, or transfer risk. Risk 
analysis, with its elements of identification, measurement and evaluation of all 
operational processes, constitutes a steering mechanism principle intended to facilitate 
managerial control over operational hazards. 
3.3.3 Planned inspections 
Inspection programmes are well documented in current literature and international 
safety programmes. A control critique however, is the lack of effective managerial 
participation in this programme. Consequently, the primary objective - identification 
of latent conditions - is only rarely achieved. This is evident from accident causative 
data such as the East Midlands Boeing 737-400 incident. 
Frank Bird (1986) suggests a specific inspection programme for managers. The 
guidelines issued for this programme require managerial participation on all levels. 
From the analysis of the programme activities it is evident that latent conditions and to 
a lesser extent, active failures, will be identified. Evaluation of the safety programme 
implemented at Koeberg during 1988 indicated that senior managers were not involved 
in the planned inspection function. To redress this, the following guidelines were 
adopted: 
• Participation of senior managers in the inspection programme. 
• Participation of middle management, supervisors and worker-elected safety 
representatives in conjunction with senior managers. 
To ensure that the inspection programme would demonstrate effectiveness, the 
following were included: 
• Follow-up on the risk potential of hazards identified during previous inspections. 
• Observation of critical task performance. 
A further justification for managerial participation in the inspection programme is 
again based on JT Reason's identification (1991:251) of managerial failure to identify 
resident accident pathogens timeously. Further, R Kuhlmann (1986:121) has shown 
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that inspections demonstrate to workers managerial commitment through visible 
activity for safety and health. 
Major hazards identified by this methodology are tabled on the business agenda of 
safety steering committee meetings. The committee determines the type of adaptive 
strategy necessary to control risks threatening process safety. Planned inspections, 
therefore, constitute a primary function in terms of risk control - they provide the 
essential link to facilitate risk evaluation via the senior management level. 
3.3.4 Programme co-ordination 
None of the papers reviewed for the purpose of this dissertation addressed the function 
of programme co-ordination at subordinate management levels. Nevertheless, the 
failure of senior management levels to give direction and control to the organisation's 
safety programme, is well documented in case studies available from the Department 
of Labour and NOSA (National Occupational Safety Association, Pretoria). Mining 
houses such as De Beers Consolidated Mines and Anglo American can attest to this 
factor. In the case of Koeberg, safety programme development stagnated during the 
years 1989-1992 for lack of senior management involvement in safety co-ordination. 
The concept of co-ordination was introduced by the author of this dissertation to 
evaluate programme effectiveness at the middle management level and, ultimately, to 
guide the behavioural response of operational staff. 
The function of safety programme co-ordination requires senior managers to direct and 
control the safety management programme at middle management levels. Based on the 
causative analyses of major national and international accidents (JC Howlett, 1994; JT 
Reason, 1991) four programme elements are identified as a means to identify, evaluate 
and control hazards threatening process safety. 
3.3.4.1 hazard identification 
Numerous papers have been written about hazard identification, but none of these 
analyses specify the criteria to be utilised to facilitate identification in the actual 
working environment. A specific hazard assessment chart was subsequently developed 
and implemented at the supervisory management level at Koeberg. 
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by Reason ( 1997: 191) when examining the safety culture of organisations that had 
suffered major incidents. A fourth reason is supervisory acceptance of heuristics ('rules 
of thumb') applied by operational staff. If task observations recognise (and evaluate) 
the application of heuristics or rules of thumb, they will provide the organisation with a 
greater evaluatory safety culture, possibly the most significant aspect of this function. 
To be successful, task observations carried out at the supervisory level will require 
evaluation by middle managers, with feedback on major deviations identified to senior 
managers. 
3.3.5 Management leadership 
Current safety programmes address the managerial leadership function in genenc 
terms, for example through presentations, public announcements, memoranda and 
addresses at functions. Leadership, as Newman has analysed, is not established by 
public announcement, it is based on executive behaviour (1975:159). Nor does a 
permissive leadership style lend itself to control strategies which require strict 
observance in terms of process safety (Newman, 1975:159). It suffices to say here that 
effective leadership is not 'underwritten' by safety programmes, which explains to 
some extent why managerial failure is repeatedly identified as the primary causative 
factor in almost every major incident in the past two decades. The following two 
programme elements attempt to facilitate safety leadership on the part of senior 
managers. 
3.3.5.1 'rock face' communication 
A programme of regular inspections facilitates communication in terms of 
housekeeping and existing hazards and demonstrates managerial commitment to 
supervisors and workers. As Cohen (1986) affirms, this activity affords informal top-
down, bottom-up communication with supervisors and workers that is essential for 
evaluating operational safety. It puts senior managers in touch with actual task 
performance, and problems encountered in this area can be directly conveyed to 
management. 
3.3.5.2 critical task procedures and heuristics 
Arising from the above, planned inspections provide, inter alia, a means of assessing 
compliance to critical task procedures, particularly during engineering related task 
performances. Statistically, the frequency of disabling injuries is higher in engineering 
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disciplines (maintenance or plant-intrusive work) than support services (non-intrusive 
work), a factor also identified by Reason (1997:85-90). A major cause of accidents is 
lack of guidelines on specific task performances. The inspection programme, 
therefore, is focused to identify the need for guidelines for critical task performances. 
The reason for this activity is two-fold: (a) identification of the use of heuristics by 
operational personnel and (b) evaluation of whether these 'rules of thumb' pose a threat 
to process safety. 
The identification of programme elements representing steering controls for the senior 
management level is herewith concluded. The following discussion briefly analyses 
the conceptual function of the programme elements. 
3.3.6 Conceptual framework discussed 
The safety programme elements discussed so far (safety steering committee, 
accident/incident investigation, management leadership, etc) define the activities 
required by senior managers to direct and control the organisation's safety programme. 








Figure 2 Exhibit 3A Conceptual framework of a safety programme: senior management level 
The function of this framework is essentially threefold: (i) direction and control of the 
organisation's safety programme, (ii) evaluation of safety programme effectiveness at middle 
and supervisory management levels, and (iii) guiding the behavioural response of persons in 
terms of managerial leadership. 
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The programme elements the organisational engineering and personal models identified by 
Deborah Lucas in her 1990 Safety and Reliability Symposium paper, as necessary safety 
programme pre-requisites. The programme elements identified for the senior management 
level meet this requirement, primarily as a result of the steering mechanisms incorporated. For 
example, the organisational model views human error as a symptom that reveals the presence 
of latent conditions in operational processes. Programme elements such as inspections, risk 
analysis and programme co-ordination do identify, however, resident accident pathogens. The 
engineering model is represented by risk analyses and task observations which are elevated at 
safety steering committee level. Finally, the personal model, with its emphasis on active errors 
and personal responsibility, is met by elements such as management leadership, task 
observations and accident investigations. From the above we can see that certain programme 
elements are multifunctional, i.e. they represent two or more safety management models. 
3.4 MEASURING CHANGE AGENTS: BEHAVIOURAL RESPONSE 
3.4.1 Introductory 
At the basis of safety programme analysis lie two problematic measurements: 
measuring the effect of safety programme elements on the behavioural response of 
persons and measuring acts of compliance which serve as indicators of behavioural 
response. The objective of these measurements is to identify changes in the 
behavioural response of senior managers as a result of the programme implemented. 
The safety programme to be evaluated was implemented during the latter part of 1993, 
and has run continuously since then. 
Measurements related to behavioural response were conducted during 1994, 1995, 
1996 and 1997. As stated previously, methods related to the analysis of behavioural 
response in a safety context are currently not available. Consequently, measurement 
and evaluation techniques were developed by the author of this dissertation. In order to 
exclude bias, qualitative questionnaires were repeatedly submitted to senior managers 
on an anonymous basis. Measurements reflected assessments on: (a) steering 
mechanism (basic controls), (b) behavioural concepts, and ( c) effectiveness of safety 
programme elements. 
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Measurement methodologies were designed to answer two questions: (i) Is the steering 
mechanism guiding the behavioural response of senior manager? (ii) Do programme 
elements at the senior management level constitute an effective safety system? 
3.4.2 Safety Steering Committee Evaluation 
Multiple choice questionnaires were submitted to the entire group of eight semor 
managers. Questionnaires were completed by way of anonymous response. A 100% 
rate of return was received by the programme analyst for evaluation. 
The primary objective of the questionnaire was to assess the effectiveness of the 
steering committee in terms of human behaviour and organisation. As a result of 
extensive management training, senior managers were considered proficient to assess 
the concepts of leadership, informal organisation, communication, decision-making 
and controlling. 
3.4.2.1 results 
a) The role of the steering committee was considered pivotal with regard to the 
direction and control of the organisation's safety programme. Significantly, the 
entire group of senior managers indicated this factor as critical to effective 
safety management. 
b) The safety standard setting efficacy of the steering committee was confirmed. 
20% of the managers, however, rated the effectiveness of the standards set by 
the steering mechanism between 60 and 80 percent. 
c) Significantly, hazard identification and risk assessment techniques facilitated by 
the steering committee were rated highly by senior managers. The existence of 
the safety steering committee enabled senior managers to provide the necessary 
leadership and administration for the safety programme. Senior managers, for 
the first time, were able to evaluate the effectiveness of process safety at 
subordinate management levels utilising inspections and risk assessments. 
Corrective actions were implemented, as appropriate, at all three management 
levels and monitored for effectiveness. This enabled a participative approach 
with regard to safety management, and facilitated the implementation of 
changes to the safety programme. 
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3.4.2.2 human behaviour and organisation 
The introduction of the safety steering mechanism required senior managers to 
utilise leadership skills for reasons of programme implementation and control. 
Unlike the 'quantitative' methodology of the then current safety programme 
initiated during 1988 (which limited the application of leadership skills), 
managers were required to exercise situational leadership skills which were 
applied to evaluate and direct compliance in terms of process safety. 
3.4.2.3 leadership 
Senior managers unanimously confirmed the provision of leadership by the 
safety steering committee in the following six areas of safety management : (i) 
developing and implementing safety programme controls, (ii) leading specific 
safety efforts, i.e. accident investigations, inspection programmes, (iii) leading 
safety programme evaluations, (iv) motivating subordinates in terms of safety 
awareness, (v) co-ordinating the safety programme at both middle and 
supervisory management levels, and (vi) having managerial safety leadership 
recognised by subordinates. 
Further, senior managers rated the steering committee's effectiveness in terms 
of leadership provision at a more or less constant level of eighty percent. 
Analysis of these results indicated that the steering committee provides an 
appropriate platform from which to co-ordinate the safety programme. This 
hypothesis is based on the premise that executive leadership (i.e. top and senior 
management) are represented on the steering committee, enabling a 
participative approach which ultimately facilitates standardisation of 
programme elements, the strategic planning of programmes and the evaluation 
of programme effectiveness. 
3.4.3 Leadership style assessments 
Multiple choice questionnaires submitted to the entire group of eight senior managers 







Senior managers were asked which leadership style they considered appropriate for 
obtaining commitment from middle managers. Results indicated that the 'situational 
leadership' style was primarily utilised by senior managers to direct process safety. 
Case studies confirmed Nigro's analyses (1965:273-274), that leadership styles are 
influenced and/or dictated at times by certain forces or scenarios governing a situation. 
More specifically, 'forces in the situation' refer to environmental pressures which a 
manager is exposed to. In a given situation, the urgency of a required safety instruction 
does not always lend itself to a democratic or laissez faire leadership style. Where 
lives are at risk, autocratic leadership styles may have to be utilised. 
The forces in a situation, which may at times be critical environmental pressures which 
surround the manager and which may stem from serious safety concerns, can dictate 
his leadership style. Typical examples of environmental pressures surrounding the 
manager are: 
• Inadequate existing safety precautions. 
• A control standard 'circumnavigated' by a work group applying a loose set of 
heuristics or 'rules of thumb' to task performance instead of adhering to prescribed 
procedure. 
• A specialised problem where the work group does not possess the knowledge and 
skill to perform a task safely. 
• A non-supportive organisational culture. Deficient or lacking safety programme 
standards will induce a non-supportive culture. By contrast, Robbins (1996:685) 
demonstrates how a culture with strong organisational values creates an internal 
climate of high behavioural control. 
The following narrative indicates the variance of leadership styles required for safety 
management. 
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3.4.4 Informal organisation 
We recall here briefly that senior managers were not committed to support the safety 
programme. These 'non-deliberate departures from the formal organisation plan' were 
evident in the group norm amongst senior managers to remain 'not involved' in safety 
programme activities. The reason for this policy of non-involvement was found in the 
marked absence of safety policy at executive leadership level during the time period 
1988 - 1992. 
As a result, senior management abdicated their leadership role to subordinate 
management levels. This non-deliberate departure to limit participation in programme 
activities was triggered by the lack of cohesive safety policy, and thus of a structured 
safety programme for the organisation. This in turn meant that senior managers were 
not able to co-ordinate the safety programme of the organisation. 
Multiple choice questionnaires were submitted to senior managers to measure their 
commitment to safety both prior to the implementation of the steering committee and 
post steering committee exposure. 
3.4.4.1.measuring commitment after the steering committee 
The introduction of a safety steering mechanism changed the informal organisation. 
Whereas senior managers had not supported the formal plan, i.e. co-ordination of the 
safety programme, the advent of the safety steering committee encouraged their 
commitment. Two related reasons for this change are: 
(i) the health and safety steering committee facilitated determination of safety 
policy for the organisation; 
(ii) as a consequence, the safety steering committee enabled senior managers to co-
ordinate the organisation's safety programme. They were able to measure 
compliance to safety programme elements, evaluate effectiveness and 
implement corrective actions. 
As a result of programme co-ordination, structured safety programmes were 
implemented at subordinate management levels. Evaluation of questionnaires (both 
quantitatively and qualitatively) indicated that the informal organisation at senior 
management level was supporting the formal organisation plan, i.e. safety programme 
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co-ordination. This constituted an important paradigm in the managerial informal 
organisation. Senior managers supported the implementation of structured safety 
programmes for both middle and supervisory management levels. This was strongly 
indicative of a change in the informal organisation. 
The evaluation process also indicated a notable change of commitment on the part of 
senior managers. Commitment to the safety programme, measured on a scale of 1-5, 
had increased fourfold! 
What is emerging here is that steering controls are pivotal for the paradigm shift 
occurring in the informal organisation. Steering controls prevent non-deliberate 
departures and minimise the formation of a 'negative' informal organisation which 
does not support organisational safety objectives. It can be argued, of course, that a 
non-deliberate slip from the formal organisation is possible despite steering controls. It 
is put forward, however, that application of a steering mechanism will minimise 
departures and maximise commitment. 
The informal organisation at the senior management level had changed its non-
committed stance into that of support for the safety programme, primarily as a result of 
the organisation's steering committee with its required evaluation of programme 
effectiveness at subordinate management levels. 
3.5 COMMUNICATION 
Before the introduction of the Safety Steering Committee, the following received very little 
emphasis: 
• safety programme information exchanges with peers on a regular basis; 
• downward communication of safety issues to subordinate levels of management, 
including workers; 
• guidance to middle and supervisory management enabling it to identify latent 
conditions and active errors. 
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Upon the introduction of the safety steering committee, senior managers were, for the first 
time, in a position to discuss aspects of the safety programme with their peers in a structured 
manner. 
3.5.1. Lateral communication 
Evaluations of multiple choice questionnaires indicated that, as a result of the safety 
steering committee's business structure, senior managers (heads of department) were 
discussing safety issues on a lateral level as often as once a week. This had not been 
the case before in this group of managers. Accordingly, process safety awareness 
amongst senior managers was heightened. This new awareness permeated down the 
line of command. Significantly, subordinate levels of management benefited from the 
channel of lateral communication facilitated by the steering mechanism : 
• risks threatening process safety received the backing and support of semor 
management; 
• senior managers identified with programme elements which governed process safety. 
• lateral communication facilitated programme leadership at the worker level. 
3.5.2 Downward communication 
A planned inspection schedule for senior managers, developed via the steering 
committee process, facilitated downward communication as it enabled address of lower 
level managers and workers directly on safety issues. For example: 
• The senior manager (e.g. during inspections) measured compliance to safety standards 
in his respective area of accountability. He communicated his observations directly to 
supervisors and workers. 
• The senior manager, if so required, could directly address supervisory management and 
workers on relevant safety issues. 
• The senior manager created 'a positive safety image' with his 'shopfloor' safety 
inspections, i.e. his involvement on the shopfloor demonstrated concern and 
commitment. This in itself communicated the unspoken viewpoint that safety was to 
be taken seriously. 
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Senior managers, chairing departmental safety committee meetings, would address 
subordinate managers on safety issues. This committee process facilitated the safety 
programme co-ordination with middle managers and the creation of a co-operative 
safety culture through participation and group interaction. The senior manager, 
moreover, was seen to be committed to safety. 
3.5.3 Upward communication 
Certain principles discussed under 3 .4 .2 'Assessing downward communication', 
facilitated upward communication, including planned inspections by senior managers. 
During weekly safety inspections in his area of accountability, i.e. workshops, plant 
areas, etc. the manager would be in a position to discuss safety-related issues with 
supervisors and workers. This resulted in hazards being brought directly to the 
attention of the senior managers without the filter process of a further two management 
levels possible distorting information. It must also be stated that certain safety issues 
raised by workers were in this manner quickly and accurately resolved. 
Further, the senior manager was in a position to receive feedback directly from the 
worker level. Consequently, safety hazards were resolved more timeously, bringing 
about a better understanding (by both manager and worker) of the magnitude of certain 
identified hazards. 
Summary of achievements 
The introduction of a safety steering committee facilitated structured communication in 
the organisation. Significantly, lateral communication was utilised to co-ordinate the 
safety programme at senior and subordinate management levels. The support 
programme element of planned inspections facilitated upward and downward 
communication, involving middle, supervisory management and worker levels 
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3.6 DECISION-MAKING 
Senior managers, before the implementation of the safety steering mechanism, were 
not able to confer with one another on a structured basis to implement safety policy. 
As a result, decisions required for the management of a safety programme were taken 
on an ad hoc basis only. 
The introduction of the safety steering committee enabled lateral communication which 
in turn facilitated decision making. These improvements were established via 
qualitative assessments. The participation of the Chief Executive Officer and senior 
managers on the safety steering committee facilitated interaction on the structure of 
process safety. Senior managers, therefore, were able to obtain lateral clearances from 
one another before decisions on safety control standards were taken. 
The health and safety steering committee facilitated decision making as semor ) 
managers were able to communicate laterally on safety programme co-ordination. 
Managerial inspections made the process of measuring compliance easier. Evaluating 
programme effectiveness requires lateral clearances from participating managers. 
3. 7 CONTROLLING 
3.7.1 Planned inspection programme 
The planned inspection programme devised for senior managers included all 
areas of plant, process and equipment. Inspections were carried out on a 
monthly basis in conjunction with middle, supervisory management and 
employee representatives. The inspections were utilised to measure compliance 
to the following programme standards: 
(a) Measuring safety programme compliance at middle and supervisory 
management levels. 
Compliance with strategic and support programme elements was measured by 
semor managers. To this end, safety records of middle managers and 
supervisors were checked in terms of compliance, e.g. critical task 
observations, risk assessments or safety communication at the worker level. 
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Workers, on the other hand, were questioned by senior managers as to whether 
they had received communication on process safety. 
(b) Inspection of the place of work 
Actual physical conditions, i.e. equipment, materials and environment, were 
inspected. Premises were evaluated in terms of housekeeping and risks posed 
to workers by process activities. As inspections of this nature were carried out 
by team with the responsible managers participating, it was possible to rectify 
substandard conditions which posed specific hazards to operational safety 
timeously. 
( c) Inspection by team 
As indicated above, inspections were carried out by team. This implies that 
areas or groups were inspected with the responsible middle manager and 
supervisor participating. 
objectives: 
This required participation achieved the following 
• Senior managers would visibly demonstrate their commitment to the safety 
programme to subordinate managers and workers. 
• Problems identified during inspections would be directly brought to the 
attention of the responsible manager or supervisor. 
• Team approach facilitated information exchange on perceived problem areas 
between managers and workers. Put differently, workers were able to access 
senior managers directly with regard to safety problems experienced in the work 
situation. 
• During repeat inspections, managers would be able to assess whether remedial 
actions to assure worker safety had been effectively implemented. 
3.7.2 Primary controlling function 
The safety steering mechanism was utilised to evaluate major findings/issues 
identified during inspections which posed risks to process safety. Additionally, 
a review of risks was exercised by the programme analyst to ensure corrective 
remedial action. As required, risks were subjected to the adaptive strategies of 




therefore relies on the identification and measurement of risk through the 
medium of inspections. Evaluation and control of risk is also, however, carried 
out at steering committee level. 
3.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Attempts to implement a safety programme without the evaluation mechanism of a 
steering committee had induced programme failure at the senior management level. 
Significantly, methods and models employed for measuring programme effectiveness 
excluded the identification of strategic and support programme elements. 
Consequently, behavioural response at the senior management level failed to co-
ordinate the organisation's safety programme. Analysis of programme failure 
indicated that managerial leadership failed for reasons of inadequately structured 
programme elements. Consequently, the informal organisation at this level responded 
with a non-deliberate departure from the formal plan. As the framework conceptually 
excluded lateral communication, decision making and the primary channels of 
communication remained ineffective. 
Drawing on the insights gained through the analyses outlined above, the revised safety 
programme conceptually included steering controls at both the strategic and support 
programme element levels. The safety steering committee structure required 
mandatory participation by senior managers, thus facilitating lateral clearances required 
for the implementation of organisational objectives. 
The inclusion of steering controls linked to the senior management level enabled 
evaluation of safety programme effectiveness, a concept not practised before at this 
level. Support programme elements were structured to enable measurements of 
compliance at both the middle and supervisory management levels. Methods of 
measurement for programme evaluations were incorporated m support 
elements/variables. The function and effectiveness of these elements was evaluated by 
the safety steering committee. The structure of these elements included the analysis of 
descriptive statistics and measurements of compliance, i.e. accident analyses and 
programme co-ordination, respectively. Methods of measurement differed in scope 
and domain, i.e. managerial inspections measured compliance in terms of operational 
processes whereas other variables measured compliance to safety control standards. 
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This safety management model facilitated measurements of compliance on all three 
managerial levels with feedback mechanisms to the safety steering committee. 
The effect of the safety management system on the behavioural response of senior 
managers was evaluated by a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods of 
assessment. Qualitative assessments were also based on the purely descriptive analysis 
of statistics, i.e. measuring accident frequency rates. The concept of leadership, when 
measured, was strongly influenced by the safety steering committee and support 
programme elements. An outstanding paradigm shift occurred at the senior 
management level. An emergent inductive process facilitated safety programme 
implementation at subordinate management levels. Concomitantly, the non-deliberate 
departures from the formal organisation plan were reversed or, put differently, the 
noncommittal stance of managers was altered. 
The lateral clearances afforded by the safety steering committee restructured 
communication and decision-making, and were conceptually aided by the support 
programme elements. 
At the same time, the controlling function was restructured by adapting the support 
programme elements to measure compliance in areas critical to process safety. 
Significantly, the process of evaluation introduced by the safety management 
programme via steering controls provided the primary inputs in terms of behavioural 
response. 
The following chapter repeats the discussion of a specific safety management system at 
the middle managerial level, continuing the conceptual framework outlined so far. 
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4. CHAPTER FOUR: METHODS, MODELS FOR IDENTIFICATION AND 
MEASUREMENT AT MIDDLE MANAGEMENT LEVEL 
4.1 IDENTIFICATION - INTRODUCTORY 
Middle management ( also equated with line management) has been implicated in the causation 
of accidents because of its failure to identify latent conditions and active errors. These are the 
two factors consistently singled out by authors such as Reason (1991:203) and Stanton and 
Noyes (1997:109). Both failures are, moreover, generally confirmed by principal investigators 
tasked with the identification of causative factors of major accidents (for example Legasov in 
his 1986 investigation of Chernobyl and Blackbeard in his 1995 investigation ofVaal Reefs). 
This dissertation, therefore, seeks to assign to the middle management level specific activities or 
programme elements that will help it to identify latent conditions and active errors. The 
programme elements will focus primarily on the evaluation of required safety standards during 
task performance at the supervisor/worker level. For this purpose steering controls are utilised 
to ensure evaluation of task performance during operational processes. Middle managers in 
conjunction with supervisors will be required to measure compliance to existing safety control 
standards. They are further empowered to evaluate on a continuous basis the existence of 
latent conditions - resident accident pathogens - which can endanger the safety of operations. 
4.1.2 Function of Steering Controls 
The function of steering controls lies in the evaluation of safety programme effectiveness 
of the various middle management groups at Koeberg Nuclear Power Station. The 
intention is to provide middle managers with a mechanism for measuring operative 
compliance to existing task procedures and to evaluate task procedures/processes on an 
ongoing basis in order to identify possible latent conditions or active errors. It follows 
that these evaluatory processes are designed to assess the behavioural response of 
operational personnel. 
The steering mechanism prescribed for the above process is a group safety committee 
with a specific structure to facilitate evaluation of the safety programme at both middle 
and supervisory management levels. Incorporated into this process is the provision of 
support programme elements which measure operative compliance to existing task 
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procedures and continuously evaluate task procedures/processes for latent conditions or 
resident (accident) pathogens. 
The group safety committee, in terms of staffing, will require the mandatory 
participation of the respective group manager, 'frontline' supervisors and worker-
elected safety representatives. Group managers, via the committee agenda, are required 
to measure supervisor/operator compliance to safety programme requirements. 
Examples of these measurements of compliance are supervisory task observations, 
inspections and hazard assessments. 
The above measurements of compliance are evaluated at group safety committee level. 
Where compromised behavioural response is indicated, corrective actions as appropriate 
are then assigned to committee members, i.e. supervisors, worker representatives or 
investigations are conducted to determine root causes. Where latent conditions are 
identified, the committee will attempt to resolve the problem 'in-house'. If, due to 
organisational constraints, this is not possible, the matter is deferred to the safety 
steering committee senior management level. 
This chapter attempts, therefore, to assign specific safety programme elements to the 
middle managerial level to evaluate safety programme effectiveness. For this purpose a 
safety steering mechanism is utilised to evaluate compliance to existing safety 
programme standards. Measurements of compliance, provided by support programme 
elements, are evaluated by the group safety committee. Again, the role of steering 
controls and their impact on human behaviour is central to the discussion in this paper. 
4.2 IDENTIFICATION: PROGRAMME ELEMENTS 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The middle manager, in a 3-tier organisational hierarchy, is normatively tasked with the 
actual co-ordination of the safety programme and required measurements of compliance. 
This entails programme implementation at the supervisory/worker level. In the past, the 
structures of the safety committees regrettably excluded supervisory staff with essential 
'frontline' knowledge. This had effectively prevented middle managers from 
implementing the safety objective in the steering mechanism programme at supervisory 
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level. To compound matters, safety committees were not structured to evaluate 
programme effectiveness at the 'rockface'. 
4.2.2 Group Safety Committee 
As discussed above, safety committees were not structured for programme co-
ordination and evaluation. Consequently the steering mechanism, i.e. measurement and 
evaluation of safety programme effectiveness, could not be put in place. This 
dissertation therefore seeks to restructure both the human resource and safety 
programme functions at group committee level to promote the application of steering 
controls. 
4.2.2.1 participation by supervisory management 
Safety committees at Koeberg Nuclear Power Station were restructured to provide, 
under middle managerial chairmanship, participation by 'frontline' supervisors and 
worker elected safety representatives. Although Goodman in his 'Rushton Quality of 
Work Experiment' (1979:48) accepted supervisory participation on safety committees, 
measurements of compliance and evaluations of programme effectiveness were not 
carried out. Analysis of the 'Rushton' Accident Data revealed a static severity rate, 
with Goodman (1979:52) concluding that accident rates remained unchanged. 
Goodman's experiment clearly shows that the mere presence of supervisors on safety 
management committees does not enhance safety. Control mechanisms go hand-in-hand 
with this innovation. 
The purpose of the new participatory approach at Koeberg, then, was to introduce a 
steering mechanism that would continuously evaluate programme effectiveness during 
operational processes. There are powerful arguments in favour of including supervisors 
in group safety committees. Supervisors are familiar with hazards affecting process 
safety; their presence would expedite joint middle manager/supervisor interaction during 
hazard evaluation and they would in any case be responsible for implementing controls 
for hazards identified. The role of the supervisor, in a safety context, is currently 
defined within narrow limits only (Bird & Germain, 1986:58); indeed current literature 
does not analyse the role of the supervisor in process safety. In the "Rushton 
Experiment", Goodman (1979:48-52) excluded the managerial - supervisory interaction 
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at committee level. Significantly, Goodman concludes that the experiment did not 
reduce accident frequency rates over a four year period. 
Similarly, Bird (1985:187-216) in his detailed description focuses almost primarily on 
supervisory communication but excludes evaluation of safety programme effectiveness. 
Nor does he consider the managerial relationships of the group safety meetings, i.e. 
middle manager - supervisor interactions. 
Analysis of safety programme failure at Koeberg' s middle managerial level identified 
that group safety committees lacked supervisory participation. Supervisors need to co-
ordinate, however, the implementation of programme elements. Further, changes to the 
safety programme (whether a new programme element or adjustment to existing 
standards) require evaluation and feedback to assess effectiveness. Middle managers 
have to rely on supervisors for feedback from the operative/worker level with regard to 
key factors such as behavioural response and effectiveness of controls implemented. 
Quantitative analyses (safety audits) conducted in the time period 1990-1993 confirmed 
the lack of supervisory involvement in programme activities. 
4.2.3 Developing Support Programme Elements 
ln order to facilitate the identmcation of latent conditions and active errors at the 
supervisory management level, specific safety programme elements are assigned to every 
middle manager in the organisation. It is again stressed that existing international safety 
programmes entirely exclude this aspect. Nor is the role of steering mechanisms defined 
for a specific management level. Accordingly, specific support programme elements are 
adapted to the middle level executive function. 
4.2.4 Accident/incident investigations 
Traditionally organisations display the required form of accident investigation but 
essentially without effective middle managerial input. Analysis of causal factors by the 
SA Department of Labour (1995), as well as the National Occupational Safety 
Association (NOSA) indicates that managers are not familiar with accident causative 
factors and that, as a result, incidents with a high loss severity potential are not 
investigated. Consequently, the root causes of accidents are not exhaustively identified. 
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Needless to say, middle managerial non-involvement in accident investigations had 
impacted on the informal organisation at the supervisory level - they withdrew from 
active accident investigations. This was established by conducting safety audits 
( quantitative assessments) during 1993. 
Accident investigation was restructured to secure middle managerial input as follows: 
accidents/incidents exceeding a certain loss severity ( quantifiable in terms of injury 
potential and cost) required managers to lead investigations. This notably included 
'near-miss' type of incidents which required each event to be evaluated to determine the 
potential to cause major process losses. Further, middle managers are required to 
present causative factors for evaluation at the safety steering committee's meeting. 
These 'high profile' type of evaluations are to facilitate the identification of latent 
conditions and active errors. Accidents/incidents which do not exceed the required 
setpoint level in terms of severity potential and cost, are evaluated at safety committee 
level by the middle manager. 
Analysis of current accident reports confirms that supervisors, due to the complex and 
multifaceted systems of today's high-risk technologies, cannot consistently identify 
resident accident pathogens (Reason, 1994: 174). As a result, supervisors fail to 
distinguish between symptoms and root causes of accidents. This failure may derive 
from the fact that access to information is blocked by lack of 'hands on' contact with the 
process. Reason (1997: 179) has consistently argued for the exposure of operational 
personnel to the potential hazards of high risk installations, and he cites the 'Piper 
Alpha' disaster ( 6 July 1988) to confirm his finding. In order to compensate for 
'information blocks' encountered by supervisors during accident investigations, middle 
managers at Koeberg are required to analyse every incident/accident in order to identify 
contributory factors. Such data is evaluated in terms of trends identified and briefed to 
operational personnel. Hence again the imposition of a steering mechanism to evaluate 
accident causative data. 
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4.2.5 Risk assessments 
Risk, in the context of this dissertation, refers primarily to: (i) the identification of 
hazards (latent conditions, active errors) and (ii) the measures identified to control the 
hazards. Control measures include certain adaptive strategies to either treat, tolerate, 
transfer or terminate the risk of the hazard identified. 
Risk assessments are carried out to evaluate hazards in middle management's areas of 
accountability as well as to evaluate the threat posed by the hazard in terms of risk 
adaptive strategies. It follows that risk assessments provide a steering mechanism to 
assess the effectiveness of operational safety standards. Interestingly, mining giants -
notably Vaal Reefs Exploration and Mining, Rustenburg Platinum Mines, (Anglo 
American Corporation) - have adopted a comprehensive risk management strategy. 
Referring back to the lack of exposure of operational staff to potential hazards, middle 
managerial level executives need to actively participate in risk assessments. The 
implication of this finding is that middle managers need to participate in the assessment 
of major hazards to demonstrate that appropriate controls have been provided. Where 
high-risk (nuclear, gaseous, corrosive) technologies are used, activities are most likely 
to occur which require specific controls to prevent or ward off potential loss (Reason, 
1994). A brief summary of the evaluation process is given below. 
4.2.5.1 people 
People need to be evaluated because they may lack the necessary skills, adequate 
training and motivation, or they may evince abnormal behaviour patterns. Programme 
support may be lacking. People are also responsible for inadequate policy and 
communication, inadequate programme standards and tasks not analysed in terms of 
process safety. 
4.2.5.2 equipment 
Equipment needs to be evaluated because it may be 'not fit for purpose', not maintained 
or lack essential safeguards. Hazards inherent in equipment, such as physical stresses or 
latent pathogens, may have been overlooked. 
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4.2.5.3 materials 
Materials need to be evaluated because they may contain hazards, or they may be of 
poor quality, or not fit for purpose. There may be chemical or biological stresses. 
4.2.5.4 environment 
Ergonomic stresses such as noise, light, heat, contamination, dust and radiation, need to 
be evaluated for risk potential. 
The primary function of risk assessments lies in the prov1s1on of an evaluatory 
mechanism. Some of the elements of this mechanism are outlined below. 
4.2.6 New design/modifications 
The latent error analyses represented in the works of Reason (1991), Rasmussen (1988), 
as well as engineering psychology contributions by Noyes and Stanton (1997), 
accurately reflect inadequate design as a major causative factor of accidents. Analyses 
of accidents in the South African context, such as : Vaal Reefs (1995), Kinross (1986) 
and Merriespruit Dam Disaster (1994) confirm this hypothesis. Further, numerous 
disabling injuries incurred by workers are the result of incompatibility between 
equipment design, procedures/training and achievable human performance (Noyes & 
Stanton, 1997:110). Approval of new design and modifications for plant and equipment 
are often not compatible with the users expectations and mental models. As Noyes and 
Stanton ( 1997: 111) point out, the 'state of the system should always be unambiguously 
clear to the operator in order to reduce the occurrence of mode errors'. 
In order to eliminate the margin of error, design principles require structures that 
evaluate the design from a standpoint which may be hostile to the user, i.e. user 
misinterpretation as to design function (Norman, 1988 and Reason, 1991). New 
structures must, moreover, be designed for error, i.e. assume the occurrence of error 
and plan for error recovery. Plant processes must be ecologically designed so that they 
simultaneously support the skill-based, rule-based and knowledge-based levels of 
worker/operative performance (Rasmussen & Vicente, 1987). Finally, an ergonomic 
audit of design criteria must establish physical, mental and chemical stresses. (The 
'negative' response of the informal organisation amongst operational staff was induced 
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inter alia, by persisting design problems.) In order to incorporate these four criteria in 
the review of existing, new and modification designs, a two-step approach is proposed 
by the author of this paper. 
Firstly, there is an exigent need for design review at safety committee level with input 
from designer, middle manager, supervisors and worker elected safety representatives. 
Important at this stage is the user presence for the evaluation of user expectations. 
Certain facilities designed at Koeberg, for example materials handling in workshops 
(1993), were problematic to operate. (The problem is certainly not unique to Koeberg 
and evidence as to the lack of user requirements in general industry is available from the 
Cape Western National Occupational Safety Association.) Further, reviews from 
engineering and safety programme analysts are necessary to identify the potential for 
accident loss or risk factors. This is in line with Norman's 'The Psychology of Everyday 
Things' (1988) as it provides consistency of 'wrapping' between the designer's model, 
the system model and the user's model. 
Secondly, after implementation of the design, an acceptance inspection by designer, 
manager, supervisor, programme analyst and worker representatives to measure 
compliance with the original design. Where possible, systems are to be tested to 
confirm design effectiveness. Reason and Norman both suggest the exploitation of 
natural 'wrappings' between intentions and possible actions. 
4.2. 7 Inspections 
Managerial inspection programmes are, in current safety systems, primarily focused to 
measure compliance to plant maintenance standards, the operation of safe systems of 
work, cleaning and housekeeping. As Stranks (1994:86) points out, this technique 
tends to be a more general examination of safety performance at a particular juncture. 
The limitations of this inspection technique are ascribed to the exclusion of formal safety 
assessments of major hazards. A further problem is the lack of managerial participation 
which tends to downgrade the importance of these inspections. Although both Bird 
( 198 5: 121) and Stranks ( 1994: 86) propose specific inspection criteria, cognisance is not 
taken of specific process hazards or managerial participation. Yet the latter 
demonstrates managerial commitment to the safety effort through a somewhat limited 
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controlling function. The author of this dissertation argues for a wider definition in 
terms of managerial safety measurements. Analysis of current inspection programmes 
indicate limited impact on worker safety motivation and evaluation of control systems. 
This viewpoint is confirmed by Stranks (1994:86) and indirectly by Goodman in 'The 
Rushton Quality of Work Experiment' (1979). 
Accordingly, for the purpose of this paper, inspections have been re-structured to 
provide a meaningful evaluation of control systems critical to process safety. Three sub-
elements are utilised: (i) inspection of high risk areas (ii) evaluation of controls 
implemented for high risk areas (iii) worker/operative compliance to controls governing 
high risk areas. The inspection function is not limited to the areas critical to process 
safety, but also extends to aspects such as cleanliness, housekeeping and maintenance of 
physical conditions. But the emphasis is redirected to assess factors critical to process 
safety, the aim primarily being the identification of latent conditions and active errors, 
which, as Reason has convincingly argued (1997:10) forms the basis of accident 
occurrence. 
This revised inspection function is to facilitate the identification of latent errors in areas 
of plant, equipment and systems design as well as of failures in the managerial 
organisation such as operational problems, fallible board decisions and line management 
deficiencies. Identification of errors is again based on Reason's accident causation 
model (1997: 17). The revision also allows for the identification of active errors such as 
procedural non-compliance (heuristics) and particularly utilisation of Rasmussen's adept 
knowledge-based framework (1983) as a way of measuring worker/operative error from 
changes that they have neither been prepared for nor anticipated. This point is also 
confirmed by Reason ( 1991 : 61). 
4.2.8 Task hazard identification 
Current task evaluations are limited to supervisory observations which measure the 
subjects compliance to the various steps dictated by a specific procedure. This approach 
is subscribed to by present day safety programmes such as the SA-based NOSA 
programme or U.S. International Safety Rating System. Although there is merit in 
measuring compliance to standards, this type of controlling function is beset with 
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specific problems. Analysis of task observations clearly indicates that hazards/deviations 
are identified very infrequently and that the loss potential of the hazards/deviation 
identified is mostly of little consequence. These aspects were identified by the author at 
Koeberg during quantitative assessments (1994-1997), and generally confirmed by 
franchised operators of safety programmes such as International Risk Control Africa and 
Haslac. Supervisors largely resent this function of measuring compliance as it seems to 
imply 'spying' on subordinates or watching them during task activities, often regarded 
by both workers and supervisors as breaking mutual trust. The behavioural response to 
task observation is therefore largely negated by the factors outlined above. Indications 
are that generic training directed at hazard identification does not provide immunity the 
tendency to overlook hazards during task performance (JC Cotton, 1993). 
Nevertheless, the necessity to identify hazards associated with process safety remains, 
and the author of this dissertation is advocating a 'pre-emptive' approach, in the first 
place to identify and evaluate hazards before commencement of task activities. This is 
best undertaken by supervisors, specific responsible persons or self-directed work 
teams. Secondly, worker/operative team-brief on hazards most likely to be encountered 
in the job situation is needed. This will entail a structured approach with practical 
definitions concerning risks encountered during task performance or the graphic usage 
of hazard identification charts. Where hazards are identified, risks are evaluated to 
determine (a) the need for short-term protective measures, and (b) medium to long term 
actions to control the potential of risk. This might entail replacing heuristics with task 
procedures or instituting changes to engineering design. 
4.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK DISCUSSED 
The safety programme elements discussed so far (group safety committee, task hazard 
evaluation, new design/ modifications, accident/ incident investigation) define the activities 
required by the middle manager to evaluate programme effectiveness at the supervisory/ 
operational level. 
The function of this framework is essentially threefold: 
(i) measuring compliance to programme standards at the supervisory level; 
(ii) evaluating the degree of compliance ; 
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(iii) evaluating hazards identified in terms of risk-adaptive strategies. 
Essentially, therefore, the evaluation measurements of compliance exist to indicate the 
effectiveness of behavioural response. 
The programme elements incorporate the organisational, engineering and personal models 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. The programme elements identified for the middle management 
level meet this requirement. The all-important organisational model views errors as symptoms 
that reveal the presence oflatent conditions in the system at large. This model is represented by 
planned inspections and task hazard evaluations. Both programme elements facilitate the 
identification of latent conditions via their steering mechanisms. The engineering model is 
represented by the new design, risk assessment programme elements which are evaluated at 
group safety committee level. The personal model, with its focus on active errors and personal 
responsibility is represented by group safety committee meetings, accident/ incident 
investigations and inspections. Evidently, programme elements are multifunctional: they 






Figure 3. Exhibit 4A. Conceptual Framework of a Safety Risk Management System (middle 
managerial level). 
4.3.lgroup safety committee 
The purpose of this committee is threefold : (i) implementation of programme elements 
at the supervisory management level, (ii) measuring and evaluating compliance to 
programme standards, and (iii) correcting safety system deficiencies based on 
programme evaluations. In terms of organisational behaviour the steering mechanism of 
the group safety committee intends to expedite effective leadership for programme 
implementation and evaluation and to change, where necessary, the behavioural 
response of supervisors and workers by revising programme standards. The mechanism 
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promotes lateral communication for decision-making, communication, and programme 
implementation. The Group Safety Committee also sustains the controlling function at 
subordinate management level by measuring and evaluating safety programme element 
effectiveness at supervisor and worker levels. 
The agenda of the group safety committee requires middle level executives to exercise 
the controlling function of every support programme element whether it be task hazard 
evaluation or inspections. The primary function of the support programme elements lies 
in the evaluation of safety programme effectiveness at the supervisory management 
level. Supervisory feedback on the effectiveness of this function is evaluated via the 
group safety committee. A further aim of the steering mechanism lies in the creation of 
an 'open' safety-reporting culture, a culture disturbingly absent in many organisations. 
4.4 BEHAVIOURAL RESPONSE: MEASURING CHANGE.AGENTS 
4.4.1 Introductory Remarks 
Measurements of behavioural response at the middle managerial level comprise two types of 
assessments: (i) measuring the effect of steering mechanisms on the behavioural response of 
persons, and (ii) measuring the effect of specific programme elements adapted to influence 
behavioural response. The safety programme designed for middle management was 
implemented during the latter part of 1996, and has run continuously. Measurements in terms 
of behavioural response were conducted in 1996 and 1997. As a result, certain changes were 
effected to the safety programme during 1997 and 1998. The function of three support 
programme elements was altered; the strategic programme element (group safety committee) 
with its steering mechanism, however, was not. Both quantitative and qualitative assessments 
were conducted amongst middle managers to measure change in the various categories of 
human response 
4.4.2 Leadership 
The main structure of safety committees at group level evolved to provide middle managers 
with a mechanism to lead safety programme implementation and evaluation. Historically, safety 
committees were not utilised to evaluate programme effectiveness but relegated to simplistic 
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measurements of compliance with regard to inspections conducted by safety representatives. 
Moreover, the absence of supervisors at safety committee level had made it impossible for 
managers to lead subordinates in terms of safety programme requirements (Koeberg Safety 
Audit Reports, 1990-1993.) Multiple choice, quantitative assessments were evaluated from 
eighteen responses with a 90% rate of return. The principle four factors which influenced 
middle management leadership are discussed below. 
4.4.2.1 safety steering committee 
As discussed in Chapter Three, middle managers had not been issued with safety programme 
guidelines by executive leadership. The introduction of the safety steering committee at that 
level cascaded safety policy down to middle level executives with a resultant breakdown into 
specific requirements. This enabled middle managers to plan, organise and lead the 
implementation of safety programme requirements, a practice not followed before. 
4.4.2.2 group safety committee 
The exclusion of frontline supervisors from safety programme involvement had been diagnosed 
as ineffective (see Koeberg Safety Audit Reports, 1990-1992; Stranks, 1994:6). In short, 
middle managers had previously not set in motion a 'process of influencing the activities of 
individuals or groups in efforts towards goal achievement' (Hersey & Blanchard, 1972:68). The 
revision of the safety committee, however, included both supervisory participation and 
evaluation of programme effectiveness. 
Both these factors aided the leadership function. Middle managers could interact with 
supervisors, set the necessary safety standards and lead safety programme evaluation. The 
mandatory measurements of compliance conducted at the supervisory level were evaluated via 
the group safety committee, placing the middle manager in a position to lead corrective actions. 
The structure of safety committees prior to 1993 excluded steering controls, i.e. safety 
programme effectiveness was not evaluated during committee meetings. The introduction of 
specific programme elements which measured safety system compliance - such as inspections, 
risk assessments and task hazard evaluation - provided the necessary steering mechanism. This 
facilitated choice of leadership styles as well as adapting the style of leader behaviour to the 
needs of situations and the followers. A typical example is the identification of near-miss 
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accidents where, in order to encourage reporting of such events, a trust relationship is required 
between the manager and employee. (It is a well-known fact in general industry that managerial 
reprisals against those who report near-miss incidents effectively isolates management from 
accident causative factors.) Ron Westrum ( 1992: 401-416) has distinguished organisational 
cultures according to the way they deal with safety-related information. The re-structuring of 
the group safety committee constitutes a major situational variable which in this particular 
instance, supported effective leadership (Hersey, 1972). This particular type of safety 
committee or task structure complies with Fiedler's (1967) adaptive strategy where situational 
variables determine whether a given situation is favourable or unfavourable to a leader. Fiedler 
defines the 'favourableness' of a situation as the degree to which the situation enables the leader 
to exert influence over his group. 
4.4.2.3 support programme elements 
The provision of safety programme elements, which supported the leadership function, are 
identified below. 
Planned inspections and task hazard evaluations carried out by middle managers provided 
management with self-appraisal information to be communicated to members of the group 
safety committee. Again, this constituted a specific task structure (Fiedler, 1967) which 
provided favourable information to the middle manager with which to lead and control process 
safety. Further, the planned inspection function requires middle manager - subordinate 
interaction, which in terms of Hersey and Blanchard's model, initially necessitates a high task, 
high relationship leadership style. This leadership style was found to be essential when 
introducing evaluations of safety programme effectiveness. 
4.4.3 Leadership style assessments 
Multiple choice questionnaires were submitted to a sample of eight middle managers for 







Middle managers were asked which leadership style they considered to be the most effective to 
obtain commitment from supervisors with regard to the implementation of safety control 
standards. Results indicated that the 'situational leadership' style was utilised by middle 
managers to ensure compliance to programme standards. In a safety risk management context 
the reasons for this approach were primarily found in the forces of situations impacting on 
leadership styles. Nigro (1967:273) is correct in his assessment that often 'critical 
environmental pressures' surround the manager, necessitating particular leadership styles. 
'Forces in the situation' refer to pressures bearing on the manager, stemming from, for example: 
(a) a work group not adequately briefed as to safety standards; 
(b) a specific problem posing a threat to the health and safety of workers. 
The following case study supports Nigro's hypothesis in terms of 'out of normal' 
pressures that surround managers: 
CASESTUDY3 
Workers carrying out a maintenance procedure are using equipment which has been rendered 
defective through abnormal application. There is immediate danger that complete equipment 
failure could occur, exposing workers to serious injury whilst simultaneously compromising 
process safety. In this particular instance, the middle manager halts the operation without 
recourse to supervisors and workers; ensuring termination of the task procedure. A potentially 
unsafe condition is rendered safe by the imposition of an authoritarian leadership style. 
Subsequent to this incident, the manager convenes an investigation team, endeavouring to 
establish from supervisors and workers the reason for equipment failure. (Recourse to 
democratic leadership style). We can conclude from the above that the required imposition of 
an authoritarian leadership style, subsequently adapted to a democratic model, ensures effective 
remedial action. Further, this case study contains a considerable number of forces which will 
affect a manager's leadership style: 
• workgroup 
• nature of the problem 
• pressure of time 
unable to resolve the problem 
workers exposed to hazardous situation 
need for the manager to decide quickly 
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We can conclude, therefore, that authoritarian and democratic leadership styles were utilised by 
the respective middle manager to manage a situation which impacted on worker and process 
safety. The effect of the situational leadership approach resulted in high morale and high 
commitment to the safety programme. Supervisors and workers were essentially motivated by 
the following factors : 
• authoritarian leadership style which resolved an urgent safety problem; 
• democratic leadership style which enabled worker participation to resolve specific 
safety problems. 
4.5 INFORMAL ORGANISATION 
We recall here that the entire group of middle managers, over a time period of three years, 
displayed almost identical non-deliberate departures in terms of failures to carry out safety 
programme implementation. Simon, Smithburg and Thompson's criteria (1970:192) with 
regard to the incompleteness of the formal plan applies here - the lack of an effective safety 
programme which induced middle managers to bypass the required participation. 
4.5.1 Measuring commitment before the safety steering committee . 
Multiple choice questionnaires were submitted to middle managers to measure their 
commitment to process safety. A one-hundred percent rate of return was received from 
a sample of eight middle managers. The above quantitative approach was also 
supplemented with a qualitative approach, which relied on anonymity of response and 
personal interviews. Evaluations identified a particular paradigm shift on the part of 
middle managers, details of which are discussed below. 
Questionnaire evaluations indicated that middle managers had curtailed their 
involvement in the safety programme for the following reasons : 
• lack of provision of a structured safety programme endorsed by senior management; 
• lack of safety policy arising from the above; 
• senior management failing to carry out any type of safety programme co-ordination with 
middle managerial levels. 
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Analysis of the three factors above indicate failure of the formal organisation which 
caused non-deliberate departures in terms of safety programme management on the part 
of middle managers. The non-deliberate failure by middle managers to carry out the 
formal plan, confirms Simon, Smithburg and Thompson's hypothesis that ineffective or 
over-elaborate administrative processes may 'be forgotten or ignored, even without 
deliberate intent'(1970:193). The authors are correct. Notably middle management 
programme activities were not acted on by senior management nor was a safety steering 
mechanism provided for this purpose, i.e. the organisation safety steering committee. 
4.5.2 Measuring commitment after steering committee 
The implementation of the safety steering committee marked a watershed in the 
organisation's safety management programme. For the first time, co-ordination of the 
safety programme by heads of department had not only become possible but constituted 
a requirement. Consequently heads of department were required to evaluate programme 
effectiveness with middle level executives. 
Questionnaire evaluations identified a specific paradigm shift on the part of middle 
managers. The principal factors influencing the informal organisation at the middle 
managerial level are diagnosed below. 
The safety steering committee required mandatory co-ordination of the safety 
programme; at the middle and supervisory management levels. Arising from the above 
implementation of a group safety committee at middle management level was required. 
As discussed above, middle managers, under the old dispensation, were not required to 
co-ordinate safety programmes at supervisory level. The lack of this requirement was 
also manifest in the results of quantitative analyses, for example safety audit reports, 
which consistently highlighted middle management's failure to co-ordinate the safety 
programme. 
Group safety committee. Analysis of qualitative and quantitative assessments 
revealed that middle managers supported safety programme co-ordination at the 
supervisory level. The group safety committee provided the direction and control for 
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the evaluation of programme effectiveness. Significantly, the agenda of the group safety 
committee provided programme elements with steering controls for programme 
evaluation. Newman ( 197 5, p40) has consistently argued that since steering controls 
provide inputs early enough for operational staff concerned to use the data in their own 
decisions, their personal involvement in the control cycle is high. Moreover, this close 
involvement in the control process adds to the positive response of steering controls. It 
is of interest therefore, that the implementation of the organisation's safety steering 
committee confirmed Newman's hypothesis in favour of middle management 
involvement in the control cycle of safety programmes. 
Training. Delays with regard to safety programme implementation were primarily 
experienced at the middle management level. This is directly attributed to lack of 
·specific training. Indications are that programme requirements were not adequately 
understood. This still remains a point of concern as the quality of training provided did 
not alleviate this particular problem, despite the fact that programme acceptance at this 
level had considerably changed. 
4.6 COMMUNICATION 
4.6.1 Evaluation of primary communication channels 
Primary communication typologies - lateral, upward and downward - had not been 
effectively practised in terms of safety programme co-ordination. The reason for this 
lack of primary communication is to be found in the inadequate structure of safety 
committees. Neglect of this function had precipitated safety programme failure at the 
supervisory level. The re-introduction of safety committees as a strategic programme 
element structured to provide effective primary communication was intended to rectify 
programme stagnation. The symptoms of programme failure were manifest in a lack of 
programme co-ordination by middle managers (see Safety Audit Reports, 1990-1992), 
and a lack of supervisory participation in safety committee structures. 
The 'Tripod-Delta' technique, used to assess disruptive processes in terms of accident 
causation, was utilised by Reason ( 1977: 13 5) to identify 'lack of effective 
communication' as one of eleven general failure types. Reason diagnosed three types of 
communication problems: (i) system failures in which the necessary channels of 
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communication do not exist, (ii) message failures in which channels exist but information 
is not transmitted, and (iii) reception failures in which channels exist, but the right 
message is misinterpreted. Hence, the need at Koeberg to transform safety committees 
into evaluatory types, as existing committees failed to provide even the essentials of 
primary communication. 
4.6.2 Lateral communication. 
Evaluation of qualitative assessments with a one-hundred percent rate of return indicated 
supervisory participation. The inclusion of supervisors in safety committee structures 
facilitated safety programme co-ordination. This was reflected in the unanimous 
feedback of middle managers during questionnaire evaluation. Further, quantitative 
assessments in the form of safety audits were conducted, towards the latter part of 1997 
and early 1998 which indicated that certain safety committees, although restructured, 
failed to utilise lateral communication effectively despite the inclusion of supervisors. 
Alternatively, safety committees with effective lateral communication structures 
demonstrated a rigorous compliance to safety standards. 
Middle managers in some instances failed to remove the barriers that existed between 
supervisors and health and safety representatives. Supervisors displayed a tendency to 
abdicate from safety programme involvement which introduced tensions into the 
supervisor - safety representative relationship. These tensions were not reconciled in the 
committees concerned. In this instance, the group norm of supervisors constituted a 
carry-over behaviour from past situations i.e. their non-participation on previous 
committees. This point is also made by Robbins (1996:309) who argues that group 
members bring expectations with them from past experiences and backgrounds. The 
group norm would also remain important to the supervisors for reasons of predictability 
of group members behaviour. Robbins sketches further that groups can pressurise 
individuals to change their attitudes and behaviour to conform to the groups' standard. 
These attitudes unfortunately persisted among supervisors for reasons of historical 
exclusion from setting safety standards via committee meetings. The leadership style of 
middle managers determined however, the quality of lateral communication insofar as 
the respective manager permitted the supervisor to function within the limits defined. 
This point is also sketched by Nigro (1965:271). Evidence of the above emerged during 
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safety audits of groups which had consistently displayed symptoms of non-compliance in 
terms of process safety. 
In order to address the middle managerial failures related to programme co-ordination, a 
system detailing the required evaluation of programme effectiveness was launched 
during 1998. Group safety committee agendas were restructured to require mandatory 
evaluation of programme compliance at the supervisory level. Middle managers were 
required to measure and evaluate programme compliance during safety committee 
meetings with supervisors. 
We can summarise therefore, that the structure of safety committees promoted lateral 
communication but required the effective leadership of the chairperson (middle manager) 
for ensuring supervisory participation. 
4.6.3 Upward communication 
The inclusion of supervisors and worker-elected health and safety representatives in the 
structure of group safety committee meetings made upward communication possible. 
Feedback from middle managers indicated the usage of safety committees as the primary 
function for upward communication. As discussed above, the structure of safety 
committees was adapted to facilitate upward communication by incorporating specific 
programme elements into the business agenda of these meetings. The following safety 
programme elements were included: 
Planned inspection programme 
Safety inspections were initially carried out in conjunction with heads of department to 
facilitate upward communication by middle managers. This programme failed however, 
as initially supervisors were not included in the inspection function. The programme 
was subsequently entirely restructured, with the focus on task observations and 
evaluation of safety programme compliance. The evaluation of areas critical to process 
safety achieved good acceptance amongst middle management. This was evidenced by 
the large number of maintenance and housekeeping issues identified during inspections. 
Supervisory participation 
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Supervisors, by not participating in committee structures, were not able to 
communicate the root causes of accidents to middle managers and workers. Analysis of 
accident reports indicated that supervisors were not entirely proficient with basic or root 
cause analysis of accidents. Investigation of accidents was primarily left to safety 
representatives and, furthermore, training on accident investigation had not been given. 
This essentially implied that middle managers received inadequately researched 
incident reports from supervisors. This factor created a barrier in terms of 
upward communication of accident causative data. Analysis of this trend primarily 
indicated lack of supervisory training with regard to accident investigation, and middle 
managers' reluctance to ensure supervisory participation in accident investigation. 
Subsequently, measures were introduced to remedy the problems described above. 
4.6.4 Downward communication 
A one hundred percent rate of return confirmed middle manager's unanimous opinion 
that the revised structure of committees facilitated downward communication. There 
were indications however, that middle manager/supervisor communication remained 
ineffective in certain instances. 
The determinants for both effective and ineffective types of downward communication 
are now identified. 
Structure of safety committees 
The participation of supervisors and health and safety representatives in group safety 
committee structures was diagnosed as the primary channel of effective downward 
communication. During meetings, safety programme standards were readily 
communicated by middle managers to subordinates. The effectiveness of this 
communication was reflected in the ratings attained by groups or sections during safety 
audits (see Koeberg's Safety Audit Reports 1996-1998). Limitations apply, however. 
Some groups failed to apply steering mechanisms to evaluate the effectiveness of 
process safety. These aspects of non-compliance were attributable to the permissive 
leadership style exercised by the chairman of safety committees. It is of interest to note 
that groups with compromised safety standards invariably resided under safety 
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committee chairmen who had adopted a laissez faire - permissive leadership style. 
(Safety Audit Reports 1990 - 1992.) 
A significant point is made by Newman (1975: 159) in this regard. Since leadership style 
is intertwined with the application of control standards, there should be compatibility 
between leadership style and control design. Extrapolating this principle to the area of 
safety management, it follows that the coupling of a control system predicated on close 
observance of safety standards with a permissive leadership style may cause programme 
failure. 
4.7 DECISION-MAKING 
Essentially, middle managers could not effectively implement decisions as lateral clearances with 
supervisors due to their absence could not be established. Re-structuring of safety committee 
attendance provided the channel for lateral communication, essential for effective decision 
making. However, incorporation of frontline supervisors into the committee system did not 
entirely solve all problems encountered in terms of decision-making. Supervisors, historically 
excluded from safety programme involvement, were subject to a specific 'groupthink' discussed 
above - they had abdicated their involvement in programme activities and delegated their 
responsibilities to the worker-elected safety representative. Analysis of safety audit reports 
clearly indicated that this type of abdication imposed serious limits on the degree of programme 
compliance (see Koeberg's Safety Audit Reports 1990-1992 and 1994-1997). Put differently, 
the subordinate safety representatives could not make decisions on behalf of their superiors, the 
supervisors! This particular groupthink persisted for at least four years and is attributed to 
middle managerial inactivity on the subject. Supervisory groupthink surmised that delegation of 
programme standards would not impact on decision-making. Yet in fact it did impact, due to 
lateral clearances not being available for decisions during group committee meetings (see Lau & 
Jelinek, 1984: 137). 
Lau and Jelinek (1984) in their exposition on the development of norms in small group 
dynamics, attributed decisions leading up to Pearl Harbour, Bay of Pigs and Cuba 
missile crisis to groupthink. This reasoning can also be applied to present day disasters 
such as Zeebrugge (Belgium) and Vaal Reefs (South Africa) where groupthink deemed 
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certain safety requirements as superfluous. A further problem associated with this type 
of groupthink is the rationale behind it - middle managers and supervisors ignored the 
warnings by collectively constructing rationalisations, i.e. there could be no threat to 
process safety (Janis, 1971). 
In order to influence the group norm amongst supervisors so that they would participate 
meaningfully in safety programme decision-making, group safety committees were 
restructured to include mandatory participation by supervisors and steering mechanisms 
such as task hazard evaluations, inspections and accident recall. The changes effected to 
middle managerial safety committee agendas became operative during 1998. Indications 
are that the steering mechanisms incorporated in the structure of safety committees are 
particularly effective. This positive reaction to steering controls is confirmed by 
Newman (1975:40). 
4.8 CONTROLLING 
We recall that the controlling function lacked the structure to evaluate safety programme 
effectiveness. This was evident in the absence of steering controls essential for this purpose. 
This, in essence, had deprived the organisation of effective safety management, confirming 
Newman's (1975:22-23) analysis of system failures. For the purpose of this dissertation, 
specific controlling functions were incorporated in the safety programme at the middle 
management level. Again, emphasis was placed on steering mechanisms with their related 
evaluation techniques to monitor the effectiveness of the programme elements. 
4.8.1 Restructured committees 
Accordingly, the strategic element or group safety committee function was restructured 
to enable measurements and evaluations of compliance. Unlike previous agendas, 
programme elements with steering controls were included. These programme elements 
were specific to the needs of the middle management level and facilitated the evaluation 
of process safety. The three programme elements incorporated for this purpose 
exhibited the functions of task hazard evaluation, accident recall and critical task 
observation. This incorporation expedited the controlling function by measuring and 
evaluating compliance and risk factors, and regulating and improving methods and 
results. It is of interest that safety committees in the SA context are largely structured 
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to exclude evaluation mechanisms; this raises an empirical observation: the existence of 
latent conditions and active errors are attributed to impaired controlling functions of 
safety programmes. The widespread practice to structure safety committees without 
steering controls, unfortunately contributes towards accident causation. Further, a 
correlation exists between the accident experience of a work group and its safety 
committee structure - this factor is borne out in the more favourable inquiry into group 
safety committees with steering mechanisms. 
4.8.2 Inspection programme 
The implementation of an inspection programme at the middle management level 
intended to provide self-appraisal information assessing (a) effectiveness of remedial 
actions taken with regard to accident prevention; (b) managerial commitment through 
visible activity for safety and health (Bird, 1986:12); and (c) identification of changes in 
processes or materials which may impact on process safety. Managerial non-
compliance, however, remained high as middle level executives were not held 
accountable by senior management. A further limitation posed by the inspection 
programme was the lack of steering controls: inspections were limited to the 
investigation of physical conditions such as good housekeeping and cleanliness. As a 
result, the planned inspection programme was restructured to include both a condition 
(plant)- and task-based evaluation programme, both programme elements featuring 
steering controls. Interestingly, neither Bird (1986) nor Stranks (1994) advocate the 
integration of steering controls into planned inspection typologies. This is a particular 
point of concern: excluding the evaluatory function in inspection programmes fails to 
identify the causative factors of accidents, notably latent conditions and active errors. 
4.8.3 Task hazard evaluation 
Towards the end of the period of assessment set by this dissertation, a final controlling 
factor was introduced. This primarily dealt with task hazard evaluation and was based 
on hazard assessments conducted by supervisors. There were a good number of reasons 
for this particular approach. Supervisors, due to long term exposure to certain risks, 
were not able to assess the magnitude of the hazards. Major hazards identified during 
risk observation could not be fully resolved by supervisors, but required middle 
79 
managerial input. Finally, the essential identification of latent conditions and active 
failures was facilitated. 
4.9 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has argued that the application of steering controls is necessary for the evaluation 
of safety programme effectiveness at middle and supervisory management levels. Further, that 
the structure of support programme elements needs to support the function of the strategic 
element. Both these concepts were integrated into the framework of the safety management 
programme operating at this level. The evolution from a static safety programme to an 
evaluatory system, is reviewed below. 
The structure of safety committees excluded steering controls which effectively implied that the 
safety programme at the supervisory level was not evaluated. Methods and models employed 
for evaluating programme effectiveness excluded measurements of compliance. As a result, 
accident causative factors were not identified and behavioural response at the middle 
management level failed to co-ordinate the safety programme at the supervisory level. Analysis 
of programme failure indicated that middle managers were not leading programme 
implementation/evaluation and that the structure of support programme elements did not 
facilitate safety programme evaluation. The inadequacy of the safety system framework 
affected middle management's commitment to support the programme. This lack of 
commitment constituted a non-deliberate departure from the formal organisation plan (Simon, 
Smithburg and Thompson, 1972:193). Further, as the committee framework conceptually 
excluded lateral communication due to supervisory exclusion, decision making and the primary 
channels of communication remained ineffective. 
Based on the above analyses, a lateral safety system was implemented at the middle 
management level. The framework conceptually included steering controls at both the strategic 
and support programme element levels and the safety committee was restructured to include 
mandatory participation by supervisors, thus facilitating lateral clearances required for the co-
ordination of the organisation's safety programme. 
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The support programme elements were structured to evaluate safety system effectiveness at the 
supervisory level, and provide feedback to the safety committee members. Also, support 
programme elements conceptually provided methods of measurement for programme 
evaluation. Again, functions and effectiveness of these elements are evaluated by the safety 
committee. The structure of the elements/variables makes identification of hazards and 
subsequent analysis of risk assessments easier. The methods of measurement embodied in 
support elements differ in scope and domain, i.e. inspections incident investigations carried out 
by middle managers measure compliance at the supervisor/worker level, whereas other 
variables/elements provide measurement criteria to supervisors to evaluate the safety of task 
performances, with a feedback mechanism to the safety committee. This safety management 
model therefore, provides measurements of compliance required for programme evaluation to 
both middle managers and supervisors. 
The impact of programme elements on the behavioural response of middle managers was 
evaluated by a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods of assessment. Quantitative 
assessments were based on the descriptive analysis of statistics, i.e. safety audit compliance 
measurements. The concept of middle management leadership was strongly influenced by the 
steering controls incorporated in programme elements. It is of interest to note that groups 
without the structural support of these programme elements continued to display static 
paradigms in terms of behavioural response. The spill-over effect of inadequate leadership was 
also manifest in the categories of informal organisation and controlling. Exposure to the 
steering mechanism of the programme elements reversed the non-deliberate departures from the 
formal organisation plan, and middle managers in question displayed commitment towards 
programme requirements. 
The 'lateral clearances' afforded by the safety committee through active supervisory 
participation restructured the primary communication channels. Support programme elements 
facilitated this process, i.e. incident investigation requiring supervisory participation. 
Correspondingly, decision-making was conceptually aided by the mandatory participation of 
supervisors. Supervisors were in a position to attain lateral clearances with one another, 
facilitating the decision making process. 
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The controlling function was restructured by adapting programme elements to measure 
compliance to programme standards on a continuous basis. The process of evaluating safety 
system effectiveness was aided by elements/variables with steering control functions, i.e. 
planned inspections and task hazard evaluations. 
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5. METHODS, MODELS FOR IDENTIFICATION AND MEASUREMENT AT 
SUPERVISORY MANAGEMENT LEVEL 
5.1 IDENTIFICATION - INTRODUCTORY 
Supervisors and workers are frequently implicated in accident scenarios and it is to them that 
the much-bandied about term 'human error' usually refers. Yet these frontline personnel are 
not equipped by line management to identify latent conditions and active errors. In fact, 
analyses of accident reports in the organisation identified repeat accidents, not only in the 
category of materials handling (where supervisors are responsible), but in categories such as 
design failures and training, which are not the responsibility of supervisors. Having said this, 
the analysis by Reason of the Boeing 737-400 (Daventry, 1995) and "Herald of Free 
Enterprise" incidents, and by Blackbeard of the V aal Reefs Locomotive incident, would appear 
to indicate supervisory inability to formally identify and evaluate latent conditions. Reason 
(1991: 237; 1997:10) as well as Stanton & Noyes (1997: 110) have consistently drawn 
attention to cases where workers and supervisors were aware of accident causation factors 
which they neither addressed nor reported. 
This dissertation, therefore, seeks to provide supervisory management with a safety 
programme that will assist in the identification of unsafe acts and conditions at the person-
machine interface. Accordingly, the safety programme elements designated for this purpose 
will focus on the identification of errors committed during task performance and the 
recognition of resident pathogens or precursors of accidents. 
To this end, programme elements are designed to provide procedures for critical task 
performance and to identify error in existing task procedures. Two further criteria 
incorporated in these programme elements are the identification and evaluation of hazards 
during task performance and of resident accident pathogens in equipment and materials. 
Crucially, the function of the supervisory safety programme lies in the ongoing identification 
of latent conditions and active errors which may endanger the safety of operations. Where this 
process is compromised, for example where a pathological rather than a generative safety 
culture exists, supervisors may be actively discouraged from reporting accident causative 
factors. 
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The steering controls assigned to supervisors for the evaluation of process operations and task 
procedures form the subject of the next discussion. 
5.2 FUNCTION OF STEERING CONTROLS 
Steering controls, for the purpose of this chapter fall into two categories, namely 
measurements of compliance to existing task procedures and identification of operational 
hazards. The intention is to identify the all-important resident accident pathogens at the level 
where they matter most: in the operational theatre. The primary objective lies, therefore, in the 
timeous identification of possible accident sequences. 
The steering mechanism to be utilised for the continuous identification of latent conditions and 
active errors comprises a number of programme elements with the following functions: 
(i) Task assessments. These are scheduled observations to measure operative compliance 
to existing procedures. Measurements of compliance are evaluated during group safety 
committee meetings. 
(ii) Risk assessments. These entail the identification of hazards during operational 
procedures. The risk posed by the hazard is evaluated during follow-up group safety 
committee meetings. 
(iii) Accident recall. This means that operational parameters which have given rise to 
accidents during task performance are evaluated and operational staff are briefed 
appropriately. 
This chapter attempts to assign specific programme elements to the supervisory management 
level, firstly to evaluate the effectiveness of operational procedures and, secondly, to enable 
supervisors to identify existing latent accident conditions and active failures prior to the 
occurrence of accidents. 
The next section of the paper discusses the actual composition and required characteristics of 
the programme elements in more detail. 
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5.3 IDENTIFYING PROGRAMME ELEMENTS 
5.3.1 Introduction 
Supervisors, by virtue of their position in the organisational hierarchy, are closer to the 
'point of control' than any other members of management. They know the people and 
conditions. They know what happens at the 'rock face' where people, equipment, 
materials and environment interface in order to produce goods and services. Their 
leadership will determine the emphasis that is to be placed on the various factors of 
production and safety. They are, therefore, in a position to know firsthand the 
occupational health and safety hazards that workers face in their daily task executions. 
The foremost function of any health and safety programme is to identify the hazards 
that workers and society at large will face. One of the imperatives of a health and 
safety programme is to place the supervisors in a position where they can manage 
the risks that workers face. The identification of hazards and evaluation of risks in 
the workplace is, therefore, among management's first priorities. Risk management of 
the 'critical few' (the most significant hazards) removes the root cause effect which 
produces the majority of serious incidents. As Peter Drucker states, 'the first duty of 
business is to survive and the guiding principle of business economics is not the 
maximisation of profit - it is the avoidance of loss'. Loss here constitutes, inter alia, 
downgrading incidents with regard to people, equipment, materials and environment. 
The first remedial step, therefore, is to provide the supervisor with a means to perform 
hazardous work safety. Among the control measures that can be offered to supervisors 
to govern their productive activities are operating or critical task procedures. 
5.3.1 Critical Task Identification 
In the complex interface of people, equipment, materials and environment, the 
identification of critical tasks can only succeed through a participative process. This 
implies drawing on the experience pool of supervisors and workers familiar with given 
work situations. Firstly, as experience has shown in actual participative sessions on the 
critical few, the perception of risk by supervisor and worker alike is strongly influenced 
by the time period they have carried out a particular critical task. Workers exposed 
over the years to certain hazards have lost their perception of the magnitude of 
the hazard, i.e. constant exposure to a hazard over a certain time period has seemingly 
reduced the risk of an accident occurring. This claim could not be verified by existing 
literature, but in the author's experience, based on the investigation and analysis of 
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individual accidents over a ten-year time period. Indeed, actual observations carried out 
during critical task performances have often identified a lack of hazard perception on 
the part of workers and supervisors. Task observations carried out by the author in 
supervisor/worker hazard assessment have revealed a disturbing confusion as to what 
constitutes a hazard and what does not. This phenomenon is readily explained, 
however, through two key factors: 
(i) Time and exposure : the perception of risk by a person is strongly influenced by 
the time period he has been exposed to a certain hazard. 
(ii) The organisation does not focus on the 'critical few', i.e. it focuses on 'nice to have' 
instead of 'must know' procedures. 
It is essential that a facilitator who is familiar with the given hazards of a work situation 
guides brainstorming sessions on the critical few. Such a facilitator could be the 
group's supervisor or manager, if adequately trained. Or, in the case of bigger 
organisations, a designated programme analyst could facilitate a participative process 
during which the critical few are identified. 
Furthermore, it is imperative that the facilitator is familiar with the work process. If not, 
guidance of the process is constrained by inadequate process knowledge, significantly 
limiting hazard identification. Further, participative processes, in order to generate 
commitment for task identification, need to be supported by management. 
5.3.1.1 methodology 
The currently accepted 'two best methods' to identify critical task procedures are 
described by Bird (1986:147) in Practical Loss Control Leadership. Neither method, 
however, conceives of an evaluatory mechanism. Accordingly, a programme element 
for the measurement and evaluation of task criticality is included. 
It is the author's contention, based on accident scenarios of the past few decades, that 
safety management has neglected effective critical task identification. Yet this concept 
is applicable to most of the disasters that have beset the latter part of the twentieth 
century. 
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Analysis of accidents such as those at Bophal (India), Vaal Reefs and Three Mile 
Island, indicates that safe operating procedures were in existence. However, Reason 
(1997 :7 4) questions the effectiveness of these procedures, since they demonstrably do 
not prevent major organisational accidents. Reason argues that procedures focus on 
production processes rather than on factors influencing the response or behaviour of 
operating personnel. Hence the author's intention to guide behavioural response right 
from the start by introducing an evaluatory mechanism when operating procedures are 
drawn up. 
In task-by-task observation, experienced personnel assess the probability of operator 
error when carrying out a critical task. Threads that may induce human error are 
evaluated and listed against the task step of a specific procedure. (Actual experience 
has shown that this need not be a laborious or lengthy process, in fact it seemed to 
shorten certain procedures. Actual knowledge of the hazards identified enabled 
operators to focus on aspects that were critical in terms of the operational process to be 
followed. 
Some practical implications or spin-offs of the task-by-task observation method 
include: 
• Identification of potential problems not anticipated during the design of a stage. 
Typical examples are the design problems encountered with the roll-on/roll-off 
ferries ('Herald of Free Enterprise') and mining locomotives (Vaal Reefs incident). 
• Identification of equipment deficiencies. Ranking high amongst basic causes of 
accidents is the inadequacy of equipment design, particularly in the SA context. 
Poor ergonomic design of equipment causes a large number of disabling injuries, 
particularly in power generation (Bird, 1982:61). 
• Identification of active errors. Observing task performance helps to assess the 
effectiveness of written procedures. 
This concludes the hazardous task evaluation methodology. The existence of critical 
task procedures alone will not, however, provide continuous identification of latent 
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conditions and active errors in the person-machine interface arena. How this may be 
done is the subject of the next discussion. 
5.4 DEVELOPING SUPPORT PROGRAMME ELEMENTS 
The function of support programme elements at the supervisory management level is of 
a critical nature. It is precisely here, at the person-machine interface, that the final 
phase of accident causation is initiated. The supervisory management level is, so to 
speak, the last barrier to be breached. For instance, frontline personnel may 
intentionally or unintentionally disable certain defences in order to achieve local 
operational objectives. Typically, production pressure may result in short cuts, i.e. not 
complying with precautionary measures. Alternatively, frontline operators may fail to 
diagnose an off-normal system state. The Three Mile Island nuclear incident is a 
typical example where operators failed to diagnose process parameters correctly, 
resulting in the release of small quantities of radioactive material. 
The identification and measurement of latent conditions and active errors at the 
supervisory management level serves a dual function that is critical in nature: (i) 
timeous evaluation of hazards by the organisation management, and (ii) constant 
vigilance at the rock face by operational personnel. The programme elements 
developed for this dual purpose are discussed below. 
5.4.1 Hazard identification 
Supervisory staff, in conjunction with operatives, are required to assess the 
safety of task performances in order to facilitate the identification of resident 
accident pathogens. This principle, as the analysis of accident scenarios has 
shown, is of primary importance for the maintenance of process safety (Reason, 
1994) despite the fact that Stranks (1994) and Bird (1986) conceptually limited 
its application when analysing safety programmes. 
The identification of hazards during actual process activities must take into 
account that relatively complex, non-linear production systems - such as 
nuclear power and petrochemical plants - require specific analyses because 
certain information about the state of the system must be obtained indirectly or 
inferred and the possibility of isolating failed components is limited. 
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Furthermore, many common-mode connections (i.e. components whose failure 
can have multiple effects 'downstream') are present, and there is only limited 
understanding of some processes, particularly those involving transformation 
(Perrow, 1984). 
5.4.2 Critical task observation 
This element evaluates whether operatives/workers adhere to the operational 
standards set for specific tasks by the organisation. For example, supervisors 
will carry out observations to measure whether subordinates comply with a 
particularly hazardous task as per written standard. This activity provides 
insight into the effectiveness of operational procedures which may, inter alia, 
suggest the need to upgrade a specific standard or improve training manuals. 
Alternatively, it may simply confirm the effectiveness of the status quo. 
One of the dictates of risk assessment is that compliance of task performance 
and certain critical activities can only be measured by actual observation. 
Examples in this context would be found in the maintenance arena, for example 
the critical activities of removing the reactor head to enable refuelling, purging 
systems with explosive or asphyxiating gases, or replacing turbine rotors. A 
considerable number of these tasks, because of critical interfaces created by the 
operational complexities, have to be physically observed to identify the 
potential hazards. 
Although Reason never specifies the concept of task observation for the 
identification of active errors, his analysis of "Herald of Free Enterprise" in 
particular, indicates that the failure to close the bow doors of the ship 
constituted non-compliance with procedure. This non-compliance had been 
repeated (without mishap) many times prior to the incident. But on that fateful 
day, when the ship again left port with the bow doors open, water flooded in 
and the vessel capsized. 
Accident scenarios in the nuclear, mmmg and manufacturing industries 
invariably indicate that managerial activities fail to identify and measure active 
errors. Accident analyses clearly indicate that in non-linear and tightly coupled 
industries the omission of task observations is an accident causative factor. 
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Typical examples are the Piper Alpha (6 July 1988), and Phillips 66 Company 
(23 October 1989). 
The problem is compounded by the current structure of safety programmes, and 
to a large extent by the fact that supervisory management is not trained in 
hazard identification and critical task observation. Problems also arise due to 
supervisors' lack of involvement in the replay of accidents scenarios, for which 
specific observation skills are required. This problem is augmented by most 
supervisors' (possibly natural) reluctance to evaluate their subordinates in terms 
of procedural compliance with any rigour, fearing to be seen as on the side of 
management. 
Conclusively, task observations facilitate the measurement of compliance to 
existing standards. They provide a basis for the identification of active errors 
which are useful to influence the cognitive knowledge structures of the 
observer. Observation and evaluation of deviations will assist in the correct 
recall of accident data and provide the added advantage of identifying latent 
conditions. This advantage was repeatedly verified in task observations. 
Hazardous conditions were actually more readily identified than deviation from 
procedure. Areas of assessment were primarily maintenance activities at the 
nuclear power plant. 
5.4.3 Accident/incident recall 
The introduction of accident recall has two main purposes, namely to 
familiarise supervisors and workers/operatives with accident causative factors 
and to compensate for schematic error tendencies on the part of supervisors and 
workers during task performances and accident/incident investigations. 
Systematic errors can arise from fitting incoming data to the wrong schema 
(Reason, 1991) or from relying too heavily upon active or salient schemata. 
Most of these schematic error tendencies can be explained by a single principle: 
a schema only contains evidence of how a particular recollection or sensory 




The principles of accident recall ( accident causation symptoms and root causes 
identified and related to task performance), possibly compensate for the 
variables of schemata with default values. Particularly at the 
supervisory/worker level, the same error in terms of accident causation is 
repeated frequently, explaining why certain industries are faced with static 
accident frequency rates despite safety awareness programmes and generic 
safety training. Analysis of industrial accidents shows repetition of error in the 
various categories of accident causation. This is in support of Rumelhart's 
(1977) theory that high-level knowledge structures (schemata) contain 
information slots or variables. Each slot will only accept a particular kind of 
information. If the current inputs in an industrial environment fail to supply 
specific data to fill those slots, they take on 'default assignments': stereotypical 
values derived from past interaction with the industrial environment. This habit 
may also explain Rumelhart and Orton's theory (1977) on the activation of 
schema: only instantiated schema are stored in memory. During the process of 
accident recall, generic information may be used to further interpret a particular 
memory from the instantiated schema record. The purpose of accident recall as 
a safety programme element therefore seeks to fill the schemata slots with the 
required kind of information which, in a supervisory and worker context, is 
utilised to prevent task error. By linking accident causative data to personal 
experiences with persons, equipment, materials, plant or environment, default 
assignments of the various slots of schemata are possibly limited. 
The intention is, therefore, to assist the correct encoding of the representational 
function of schemata for purposes of lending structure to accident experience. 
5.4.4 Accident pre-emptive task procedures 
Task instructions at the supervisor and worker levels are primarily directed at 
providing a control system for the prevention of error during task execution. 
Task instructions are a mechanism for avoiding the more serious errors made by 
those in supervisory control of industrial installations, notably maintenance 
functions. Generally, all existing task procedures are written up as linear step-
by-step appraisals to be followed. The structure of such procedures, however, 
essentially provides no mechanism to interpret and evaluate conditions which 
threaten the normative function of the procedure. The North Anna incident 
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(Pewietal, 1981) identified that operator-induced error had its ongm m 
mandatory procedures which left no room for manoeuvring during an 
emergency. Duncan (1987:210) points out 'the intrinsic limitation that, by 
definition, an algorithm will only distinguish the set of occasions which could 
have been foreseen. If an unforeseen event occurs, the operator is to helped ... ' 
JT Reason demonstrates, in his analysis of potential measures for error 
reduction, that 'existing diagnostic rules did not increase the correct diagnosis 
rate in comparison to circumstances where rules/procedures were not readily 
available' (1994:243). 
The larger the number of discrete steps in an action sequence, the greater the 
probability that one or more will be omitted. Further, the greater the 
informational loading of a particular procedural step, the more likely that items 
within that step will be omitted. Also, procedural steps that do not follow a 
direct linear sequence are likely to be omitted (Reason, 1991 :243). 
Such observations prompt an analysis of the efficacy of current task procedures. 
It is the author's contention, therefore, that task procedures, when the normative 
function is threatened, can provide the user with a mechanism to evaluate how 
best to deal with changed circumstances. To meet this requirement, a particular 
task procedure must facilitate the interpretation and evaluation of off-normal 
parameters. Rasmussen and Jensen (1974), for example, have identified as part 
of contemporary schema, a 'knowledge-based level that is triggered in unusual 
situations for which actions must be planned on line ' - using conscious 
analytical processes and stored knowledge (Reason, 1994). Rasmussen's 
stages of decision-making at the knowledge-based level include both 
interpretation and evaluation of a given set of data, which in effect 
constitutes the application of steering controls (adapted by the author, 1998). 
In order to facilitate the application of steering controls in task procedures (task 
procedures are essentially yes-no controls only), the author proposes a tripartite 
approach: 
(i) Steps which are critical to the effective execution of the procedure are 
identified. Analysis of accidents indicates that supervisors and workers are 
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seldom familiar with critical aspects of task performance. Accordingly, steps 
critical to task execution are highlighted to enable easy recognition by the 
taskmaster (supervisor and/or worker). 
(ii) Critical step failure scenario is introduced. This entails 'one or two liners' 
describing the consequence of critical step failure. This built-in negative 
evaluation process has one purpose only: to trigger automatically the 
knowledge-based schema of the taskmaster (interpretation and evaluation) by a 
procedural signal. The intention is to equip the taskmaster with a steering 
mechanism with which to control the possible sequential error of a procedure to 
be followed and/or recognise impending error in other areas of task 
performance. Analysis of accident causative factors and the author's own 
research, strongly point to the current mismatch between the characteristics of 
technical systems, e.g. maintenance procedures and human information 
processing. Reason points out 'that system designers have unwittingly created 
a work situation in which many of the normally adaptive characteristics of 
human cognition (its natural heuristics and biases) are transformed into 
dangerous liabilities' (1994:238). 
(iii) Supervisors and workers are regularly briefed on critical steps and their 
evaluation in failure mode. For this purpose a participative process is 
envisaged to expose supervisors and workers to steering mechanisms, and with 
increasing expertise, the focus of control moves from the knowledge-based to 
the skill-based levels in terms of Rasmussen's framework. 
5.4.5 Steering-based task instruction 
Steering-based task instruction is not a formal training programme, but intends 
to reinforce, on a continuous basis, the evaluation of critical steps of task 
procedures with supervisors and workers. Most of the more serious injury-
related accidents occur at the worker level, even though written work 
instructions are explicitly followed. Analyses of these accident scenarios have 
identified the limited application of critical step evaluation by technicians, 
supervisors and artisan-based staff. 
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Communication of critical step evaluation by supervisory/technical staff to 
operatives is based on a tripartite approach. 
(i) Critical step evaluation before the execution of task performance. 
The current method, whereby the task procedure to be followed is thrust 
unceremoniously into the operative' s hand, does not make allowance for the 
evaluation of task criticality. In order to facilitate critical step evaluation with 
subordinates, supervisors need briefly to review task criticality with the workers 
concerned as part of normal routine job instruction. Bird and Germain (1986) 
developed a near identical principle called 'key point tipping', although it 
excludes the evaluation mechanism of critical steps. Rasmussen's two stages of 
decision-making (interpretation and evaluation) come into play here - with 
increasing expertise, operational errors are reduced. A further benefit of 
Rasmussen's approach to the pre-emption of accidents, is that staff are 
increasingly able to identify accident-producing sequences. 
(ii) Critical step evaluation by team talk 
The current method of raising the accident awareness level is achieved by so-
called shop floor safety talks. Staff in a particular area/group are required to 
participate and topics of general interest with regard to safety are discussed. 
This mostly excludes, however, any interpretation or evaluation of accident 
causative data. 
This type of safety communication has long been practised by NOSA, Chamber 
of Mines, but lacks the evaluatory process of a steering mechanism. The author 
has implemented, on a frequent basis, a critical task review by team talk. 
Critical steps are highlighted in the discussion. 
(iii) Evaluation of past accidents by team-talk 
Workers/operatives are briefed on the root causes of accidents utilising the 
structured approach outlined above, i.e. through a description of task 
performance, equipment utilised, material and environmental issues. Again the 
intention here is to provide diagnostic rules to operational staff so that they can 
recognise impending accident sequences. 
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5.5 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK DISCUSSED 
Steering controls were central to the discussion of safety programme element 
identification at the supervisory level. Significantly, these steering mechanisms 
provide three safety management models essential for spotting latent conditions and 
active errors. The management models discussed in Chapter 2 focus on essential safety 
programme requirements. 
Firstly, the organisational model views human error as symptomatic of the presence 
of latent conditions. Hence the inclusion of programme elements such as critical task 
observation and hazard identification to measure and evaluate both latent conditions 
and active errors. 
Secondly, the engineering model views human error as stemming from human-
machine mismatches or poor 'human engineering'. The engineering model is reflected 
m programme elements such as task observations, accident recall and hazard 
identification. Importantly, programme elements with evaluatory or steering 
mechanisms may have two or more functions: for example, both the organisation and 
engineering models are characterised by the same elements. 
Thirdly, the person model focuses on unsafe acts and personal injury accidents. 
Human error is seen as a result of psychological factors such as inattention, negligence, 
lack of knowledge or skills. This model is represented by task instruction, accident 
pre-empting task and critical task procedures. Neither of the latter two programme 
elements contains steering mechanisms. 
Consequently, limitations apply to the function of critical task procedures as 
(conceptually) an evaluatory mechanism is excluded. This missing mechanism is 
provided by support programme elements such as critical task observation and accident 
recall, evaluating compliance to, and measuring effectiveness of, critical tasks on a 
continuous basis. Put differently, the missing steering mechanism of the strategic 
programme element (critical tasks) is provided by the support programme element 
structure. This is in support of Reason's hypothesis that 'existing diagnostic rules [i.e. 
critical task procedures J do not necessarily increase the correct diagnosis ... ' 
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(1994:243). The existing structure of task procedures generically excludes the 
extrapolation to accident-producing factors in its step-by-step approach. 
In this light, additional programme elements are introduced which conceptually provide 
accident 'buffers' such as hazard identification, i.e. review of actual process/task 
activities in terms of safety. Similarly, critical task procedures are construed to reflect 
accident causative data. 
A conceptual framework incorporating three safety management models with steering 
controls has not been tested before in strategic industries. 
Figure 4 Exhibit SA. Conceptual framework of a safety risk management system 
(supervisory management level). 
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5.6 BEHAVIOURAL RESPONSE : MEASURING CHANGE AGENTS 
5.6.1 Introductory Remarks 
A conceptual framework based on steering controls at the supervisory management 
level was evaluated over a time period of four years (1994-1998). The subsequent 
changes to behavioural response were measured by qualitative and quantitative 
assessments. Supervisors, technicians, artisans and artisan aides were tasked with the 
completion of questionnaires. 
5.6.2 Leadership 
Prior to analysing the changes in supervisory leadership it is appropriate briefly to 
recall that supervisors had been excluded, due to ill-defined participative structures at 
the middle management level, from safety committee activities. This had effectively 
isolated supervisors from information and data required for the co-ordination of the 
safety programme at the operative/worker level. 
5.6.2.1 safety committee steering function 
Supervisory participation in committee structures restored the leadership function 
required for programme implementation. This is a singular point of importance: 
analysis of the informal organisation amongst supervisors had clearly indicated an 
organisation-wide abdication in terms of safety leadership. Put differently, supervisors 
had kept their involvement in programme activities to a minimum as a result of middle 
management's failure to address their participation in committee structures. The 
reversal of this non-participatory approach revived the once discarded leadership 
function at the supervisory level. Analysis of this ready acceptance on the part of 
supervisors identified four contributory factors. 
5.6.2.2 positive response to steering controls 
The participation of supervisors in measurements and evaluation of safety programme 
elements provided essential hands-on, working knowledge with regard to process 
safety. Further, this mechanism empowered supervisors to make inputs regarding 
decisions affecting process safety. As a result, personal involvement in the control 
cycle was high (cf. Newman, 1975:40). This close involvement in the control process 
contributed to the positive response of goal acceptance. Consequently, the most 
important hurdle was crossed when supervisors accepted their accountability in leading 
the co-ordination of process safety at this level. 
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5.6.2.3 controls compatible with leadership styles 
Since leadership style is intertwined with the application of control standards, the 
compatibility between leadership style and control design is essential (Newman, 
1975:159). For instance, to couple a control system predicated on close observance of 
safety standards with a permissive leadership style can precipitate disaster (Reason, 
1994:194). Typical examples are Zeebrugge (UK) and Vaal Reefs (SA). In an 
organisational context, the criticality of task procedures had not previously been 
analysed. Consequently, supervisors were not familiar with the criticality of task 
performance and did not know which tasks required dependability and close co-
ordination. Put differently, supervisors simply did not know which task performances 
required tight control and those which did not. Not surprisingly, the supervisory 
leadership position was not engaged to participate and involve operatives/workers in 
activities concerning process safety. Consequently, a permissive leadership style 
characterised all areas of process safety, which, inter alia, did not provide workers with 
evaluations of process safety. Subsequently, a framework with revised control 
standards was incorporated in programme elements designed to ensure the safety of 
task performances. This included the principle of the 'critical few' or Pareto's Law 
whereby the majority (80%) of any group of effect is produced by a relatively small 
(20%) number of causes. 
Critical process awareness was heightened and supervisors adapted their leadership 
style to task requirements. Significantly, supervisors adjusted leadership style in 
accordance with the steering mechanism. Analysis of leadership styles indicated that 
80% of supervisors preferred the situational leadership style, i.e. a combination of 
authoritarian and democratic. 
Fiedler (1965: Harvard Business Review) confirms that task structure or standards 
provided in terms of operating instruction facilitates leadership; the 'organisation is 
able to back-up the authority of the leader'. This viewpoint is also expressed by Lau 
and Jelinek (1985:55) in their exposition of leadership styles. 
Justification for both the authoritarian and democratic leadership style is sketched 
below. 
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Task observation by supervisory staff 
This steering mechanism identified procedural non-compliance and subsequent 
autocratic intervention to terminate a hazardous procedure. The forces governing 
process safety may be 'critical environmental pressures' which surround the supervisor 
(Nigro, 1966:273). Similarly Lau and Jelinek (1984:54-55) assert that the 
consequences of certain actions or situations will require autocratic leadership styles, 
with beneficial results. Two case studies which support the above hypothesis are 
briefly evaluated for this purpose. 
CASESTUDY4 
A rigger assistant (new employee) uses the wrong lifting procedure during a hoisting 
operation. This, unbeknown to him, is simultaneously endangering the safety of 
nuclear systems and personnel. A timeous supervisory intervention halts all hoisting 
operations (autocratic decision), until the safety of the task is restored. In this given 
situation, no other option was open to the supervisor. Where the task requires close 
observance of safety standards, a permissive leadership style will put workers and 
process at risk. 
From the above we can conclude that lack of knowledge, skill, stress or improper 
attitude on the part of the operatives can precipitate autocratic decision-making by the 
supervisor. The second case study illustrates equipment failure of a critical nature. 
CASE STUDY5 
During the removal of the primary linkages from a turbine/generator coupling, the 
hydraulic power tool starts to slip at 2000 psi pressure, distorting the path of applied 
power. This poses a serious risk in terms of operator injury and equipment damage. 
Again, this is an example of critical environmental pressure surrounding the supervisor 
for which immediate resolution is required. There will be thus a marked tendency by 
supervisory staff to resort to autocratic decision-making as dictated by the dynamics of 
a critical situation. Permissive leadership styles in situations such as these can pose a 
threat to process safety. A further case in point is that supervisory intervention in 
critical situations normally invokes tacit approval on the part of subordinates. 
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Alternatively, supervisors utilised democratic leadership styles in order to resolve 
process safety problems. The fact that 80% of supervisors preferred the situational 
leadership style implies that supervisors attempted, with the full participation of 
subordinates, to identify solutions to problem areas by group discussion and decision. 
The manifestation of a democratic leadership style was therefore evident in general 
problem solving. 
Addressing the earlier statement that 20% of the supervisors questioned on leadership 
style used a democratic approach only during task performance, it needs to be pointed 
out that these supervisors were not faced with critical environmental pressures. 
5.6.3 Informal organisation 
We recall here that informal organisation at the supervisory level, prior to the 
implementation of the revised safety programme, was non-supportive in terms of the 
formal organisation plan. Analyses of causal data indicated that a steering mechanism 
was absent and that the safety programme was inadequate in that it caused non-
deliberate departures on part of the supervisors. In their analyses of similar 
circumstantial evidence, Lau and Jelinek observe that 'the issue of involvement in 
assuming responsibility was avoided, not intentionally, and standards were permitted 
to deteriorate' (1984). In the-case of Koeberg, supervisors had also not been receiving 
middle management support for co-ordinating the safety programme. 
Multiple choice questionnaires were submitted to supervisors to measure their 
commitment to process safety. A one-hundred percent rate of return was received from 
a sample of seventeen supervisors. The above qualitative approach was supplemented 
by a quantitative approach, which was based on safety audits. 
The introduction of the revised safety programme did contribute towards changing the 
informal organisation. Due to compromised middle managerial support in certain 
areas, however, supervisory commitment had not changed as significantly as in others. 
The primary factors which influenced the informal organisation at the supervisory level 
are discussed below. 
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(i) Measuring supervisor's commitment before the implementation of middle management 
safety committees. 
Questionnaire evaluation indicated that supervisors had curtailed their commitment to 
the safety programme because they had been excluded from participation in safety 
committee structures, because the existing safety programme was deficient in structure 
and because middle managers failed to co-ordinate with them. 
Analysis of the above assessments indicates almost complete failure on the part of 
senior and middle management in the formal organisation. Deficient programme 
structures had induced a non-deliberate departure among supervisory management. 
(ii) Measuring supervisory management's commitment after the implementation of the 
middle management safety committees. 
The participation of supervisors in safety committee structures enabled co-ordination of 
the safety programme at the operative/worker level. Supervisors had previously not 
managed the various aspects of a safety programme. Questionnaire evaluation 
identified a paradigm shift in terms of safety management. 
The structure of the safety committee now required mandatory participation by 
supervisors, enabling programme co-ordination with the middle manager. Arising from 
this, measurements of compliance at the operative/worker level became possible. 
Consequently, supervisors were in a position to evaluate programme effectiveness in 
conjunction with the middle manager. 
Analyses of qualitative assessments indicated that supervisors supported the re-
structured safety programme for reasons of focus on process safety. The steering 
mechanism incorporated in programme elements such as critical task observation and 
accident recall facilitated measurements of compliance, and subsequent evaluations of 
compliance factors. 
The implementation of the safety programme experienced delays attributable to a lack 
of conceptual safety training at the supervisory management level. Consequently, 
programme acceptance by supervisors in certain areas was slower than in others. 
101 
Conclusively, the application of steering programme elements such as Accident Recall 
and Task Observation facilitated the evaluation of task performance. As a result, 
supervisors were effectively co-ordinating the safety programme, ensuring operational 
staff support for the programme. Hence a paradigm shift had occurred at the operative 
level, where support for operational safety requirements was manifest. 
5.6.4 Communication 
The primary channels of communication - lateral, downward and upward - were to a 
large extent not utilised before the introduction of the revised safety programme. This 
had constrained safety communication at the worker level. Critical safety-related issues 
were not communicated in a structured manner to the workers, who were not involved 
in safety programme activities, i.e. raising concerns that affected their safety. 
Supervisors were not providing safety information to workers on a regular basis. 
The introduction of a structured safety programme at the supervisory management level 
facilitated safety communication as information from key programme elements could 
be made available. 
5.6.4.1 assessing patterns of lateral communication 
Evaluations of the multiple choice questionnaires with a 100% rate of return from a 
sample of seventeen supervisors indicated that supervisors were discussing safety 
issues on a lateral level ( amongst peers) as often as once a week. It was evident that 
the previous demand-based, ad hoc, discussions on safety issues had been replaced with 
a structured programme. Implied here is also that safety enjoyed a higher priority with 
supervisors. 
For example, safety audits measuring compliance to the safety programme showed 
almost without exception favourable results, i.e. a 94% compliance on average. Worker 
perception with regard to safety had changed. This was evident in positive 
contributions with regard to the identification of unsafe practices and conditions, and 
reporting them to supervisors. 
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Supervisory participation in committee structures promoted lateral communication in 
terms of programme co-ordination. Certain safety committees, although restructured, 
failed to utilise lateral communication, i.e. the inclusion of supervisors remained 
largely ineffective as a result of committee chairmen failing to involve supervisors in 
programme activities. 
These tensions were not reconciled in the committees concerned and reflected a type of 
'countervailing organisation' (Nigro 1966:199). Some of the committee chairmen did 
not endeavour to improve 'small group effectiveness' (Lau & Jelinek, 1984:102) and 
group norms continued to act as a constraint (Robbins, 1996:725). Lateral 
communication therefore, was rendered relatively ineffective in certain cases where the 
sub-groupings of supervisors resisted the integration in safety committee structures. 
5.6.4.2 downward communication 
Evaluation of feedback received via multiple choice questionnaires indicated that 
supervisors were utilising safety programme elements with steering mechanisms for 
downward communication. Feedback from the observation of critical task performance 
by the supervisor meant that supervisors briefed subordinates (workers) on any 
deviations noted during measurements of compliance. 
Supervisors briefed workers on accident causal data, raising worker/operator awareness 
as to the 'trigger mechanism' of accident sequences. Safety talks were utilised by the 
supervisor to communicate accident causative information and critical task procedure 
content to subordinates. Briefing workers on critical steps of task procedures provided 
an effective means of focusing on the consequences of procedural failure. Supervisors 
also indicated that safety aspects were conveyed to workers through safety tips when 
assigning work; through daily interactions with workers/subordinates; and in specific 
group meetings intended to solve production problems. 
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5.6.4.3 upward communication 
The Group Safety Committee ( chaired by middle managers) achieved upward 
communication with regard to safety matters. This implied that supervisors, required to 
attend safety committee meetings on a monthly basis, would communicate safety issues 
upwards to their middle manager. Conclusively, safety committee meetings had 
become supervisory management's channel for upward communication. Of significant 
importance was the role of the safety committee during programme co-ordination. 
There were several reasons for this. The safety committee enabled supervisory 
feedback to middle management on the effectiveness of the health and safety 
programme. Supervisors raised problems resulting from safety programme element 
implementation with the group safety committee. This played a major part in solving 
'teething problems' - typical problems like performance criteria for key programme 
elements and standardisation of safety documentation were solved with the aid of the 
committee. Middle managers and programme analysts used the committee forum to 
assist supervisors with programme co-ordination. The Group Safety Committee had 
become the 'vehicle' for implementing the safety programme at the supervisory 
management level. 
Supervisors were therefore able to resolve safety issues with the next level of 
management in a structured manner. This contributed to the overall effectiveness of 
the programme. 
There were other avenues of upward communication. Supervisors discussed safety 
issues with the senior manager of the department during safety inspections. This 
opportunity, however, was not always readily available to the supervisor. Subject 
matter discussed during these meetings in some instances unfortunately excluded issues 
such as critical task performance. 
5. 7 DECISION-MAKING 
The nature of feedback from the operational level needs to be actively sought and analysed. 
Cognisance must be taken that often defensive filters are installed to protect the manager from 
bad news. The revised structure of the Group Safety Committee was seeking to address the 
above problem areas, by facilitating lateral communication amongst frontline supervisors and 
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line managers (Nigro, 1965:176). The restructured agenda of safety committees required 
supervisors to report to middle managers aspects of safety programme co-ordination. As a 
result, supervisory involvement in operational safety processes provided middle managers with 
salient information in terms of decision-making. Progress was made in the following areas: 
(i) evaluating new design from a safety standpoint; 
(ii) evaluating non-machine interfaces to determine accident potential; 
(iii) evaluating accident causative data to determine remedial actions. 
A particular type of groupthink persisted amongst supervisors, despite the participation on 
safety committees. Supervisors, historically excluded from safety programme involvement, 
were specifically aligned in terms of the informal organisation. This phenomenon meant that 
supervisors continued to withhold effective participation in safety committee processes and 
tended to rationalise any resistance to the assumptions they had made. This aspect is 
confirmed by Robbins (1996:321-322). Supervisors, moreover, seemingly withheld 
participation from committee structures for reasons of risk taking in terms of safety solutions 
proposed. Admittedly, conceptual safety training had not been done at their level. 
It needs to be pointed out however, that the safety committee chairman did not respond 
decisively or affirmatively in areas where a specific group think persisted. 
5.8 CONTROLLING 
5.8.1 Inspecting areas of accountability 
Supervisors demonstrated their commitment to the safety programme through planned 
inspections. As supervisors were seen publicly to support the safety programme, 
workers themselves came to evince support. The inspection function particularly 
succeeded in improving substandard physical conditions, for example housekeeping 
and safeguarding of machinery. The self-appraisal information generated during 
inspections enabled supervisors to upgrade environmental and operational conditions. 
This demonstrated management commitment to workers and, as a result, changed the 
behavioural response of subordinates. Again, confirmation of a general improvement in 
physical conditions was obtained through safety audits. 
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The steering mechanism of the revised safety programme impacted on the behavioural 
response of supervisors and workers, leading to increased worker involvement in the 
new safety programme. This implied, in practical terms, that supervisors were briefing 
workers on critical issues in a structured manner. Alternatively, workers were briefing 
supervisors on risks they encountered during task performance. This, figuratively 
speaking, 'closed the loop', for example, feedback from the shop floor was evaluated 
by supervisors and corrective action, as appropriate, implemented. 
Supervisor involvement in the new safety programme had increased. The required 
safety communication, now structured as part of the supervisory function, required 
supervisors to brief workers regularly. This implied that supervisors were 
communicating to workers the control standards of four key safety programme 
elements. This safety communication included supplying information on the root 
causes of accidents, critical aspects of task performance and briefing new employees on 
hazards in the job situation. 
5.9 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Past exclusion of supervisors from safety committee structures prevented their involvement in 
programme co-ordination. Consequently, methods and models for evaluating programme 
effectiveness were not implemented, inducing programme failure at the worker/operative level. 
Significantly, support programme elements excluded the identification of hazards in industrial 
processes, hence the stagnation of critical task evaluation at the worker level. Lack of safety 
programme co-ordination negated the lateral communication function, causing the non-
implementation of a strategic programme element or failure of support programme element 
typologies to identify human error and process hazards. 
The rev1s1on of the safety programme framework at the supervisory management level 
conceptually included a strategic programme element (its primary focus on the maintenance of 
critical task performance) and support programme elements ( conceptually evaluating critical 
task performance). Interestingly, the strategic programme element at the supervisory level 
does not incorporate a steering mechanism. This programme element is based on the 
identification of the critical few (Pareto's Law), providing standards and controls for critical 
task performances. The steering mechanism for the evaluation of programme effectiveness at 
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the supervisory level has conceptually been structured into the framework of the support 
programme elements. Methods of measurement for programme evaluation are primarily based 
on the observation of industrial processes and task performances. Ninsky (1975) and 
Rumelhart's (1975) 'schemata' (the reconstruction rather than the reproduction of past 
accidents) were conceptually structured into support elements/variables. 
The impact of the lateral safety system on the behavioural response of supervisors and workers 
was evaluated by a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods of measurements. Supervisory 
leadership was primarily influenced by the participation in safety programme co-ordination, 
which introduced strategic and support programme elements at the worker/operative level. 
The programme co-ordination afforded by the safety committee facilitated, inter alia, lateral 
communication, essential for evaluating safety programme effectiveness. The reporting 
structure of support elements/variables required feedback to and from safety committees. This 
effectively re-introduced the primary communication typologies, i.e. upward and downward 
communication, which had previously remained dysfunctional under the old dispensation. 
Significantly, the lateral dissemination of accident causative data amongst workers motivated a 
greater awareness in the area. There was a tangible achievement in this regard: the 
organisation's accident frequency rates had declined steadily during 1997 and 1998. This is 
attributed to the descriptive taxonomies of the activities stipulated for the identification of 
accident causative data at the worker level. The structure of programme elements facilitated 
worker/supervisor exposure to the root causes of accidents and incidents. It follows that the 
informal organisation at the supervisor/worker level reversed its non-deliberate departure from 
safety programme activities. It needs to be stressed however, that some of the supervisors 
serving on safety committees with inadequately maintained co-ordinating structures did not 
reverse their paradigm as other counterparts. They were effectively prejudiced by poor 
managers. Finally, the lack of effective controlling evident amongst supervisors under the old 
dispensation was rectified by: (a) measurement of compliance regularly carried out by both 
supervisors and workers, and (b) hazard identification (latent condition, active error) 
typologies structured into support programme elements. 
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6. CHAPTER SIX : A BEHAVIOURAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK 
6.1 INTRODUCTORY 
At the heart of safety management analysis lie two problems: 
(i) identifying and prioritising programme elements and their role in managerial levels; 
(ii) measuring acts of compliance which serve as indicators of behavioural response. 
As discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this dissertation, a specific conceptual framework was 
developed for the identification and measurement of safety systems. We recall here that existing 
frameworks of safety management systems (ISRS, NOSA, and benchmark efforts such as 
ROSPA, Shell, Gulf Oil, Eskom) attempt to: 
(a) identify and measure the accident-producing factors prior to their occurrence m 
industrial operations; 
(b) ascertain the probability that accidents will be of limited occurrence and low risk 
potential. 
Attempts to obtain these objectives have been constrained by required administrative systems 
('excessive paperwork'), the wide variety of programme activities and a concomitant failure to 
identify key programme elements. The lack of dynamically integrated programme activities in 
management levels has also posed a restriction (Reason, 1997). 
Consequently, although these programmes have improved existing accident frequency rates in 
general industry, the theoretical aspect of safety programme co-ordination has not as yet 
effectively reduced the margins of error in areas critical to process safety (Reason, 1994, 1997). 
Credit is given however, to existing safety programmes (NOSA, ISRS) for progress made 
regarding limited hazard identification and measurements of programme compliance. As 
discussed earlier, a formal programme that has taken cognisance of behavioural response factors 
via integrated management levels and process safety evaluation, does not exist. 
Following a review of the dissertation's main hypotheses and conceptual foundations, this 
chapter's primary objectives are to analyse critically the integration of steering controls in 
programme elements and to discuss the efficiency of assigning specific programme elements to 
109 
the various management levels. This chapter summarises the impact of these elements on 
behavioural response and assesses whether the steering mechanisms are consistent with the 
three safety management models discussed in previous chapters. 
6.2 REVIEW OF THE MAIN HYPOTHESES 
Central to the discussion presented in this paper are the hypotheses that : (a) safety programme 
elements can only be effectively identified and measured in relation to an organisation's 
management levels; and (b) steering controls, conceptually integrated in safety programme 
elements, can induce persons to respond appropriately to the needs of a safety system. Both 
hypotheses were tested empirically in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Specific programme elements were 
assigned to senior, middle and supervisory management to test the behavioural response of 
persons to safety programme requirements. Further, distinctions were made between strategic 
and support programme elements assigned to each management level, in order to provide a 
framework capable of revealing interdependencies among variables. Current national, 
international safety programmes do not assign specific programme activities to managerial 
levels, nor is the controlling function, i.e. evaluation of programme effectiveness, adequately 
defined. As current international accident scenarios invariably display the symptoms of 
managerial failure, the author of this dissertation is seeking to link accident causal data to 
inadequate managerial structures, which consequently affect the behavioural response of 
persons . 
. 6.3 REVIEW OF CONCEPTUAL FOUND A TIO NS 
6.3.1 Chapter 3: Senior management level 
The absence of a safety steering process in the organisation meant that specific 
guidelines with regard to safety programme co-ordination were not available to 
executive leadership. Since specific programme activities were neither defined nor 
required, senior managers were not in a position to lead safety programme mandates, 
thus exhibiting a lack of commitment to subordinate management levels. In terms of the 
informal organisation, senior managers had abdicated from the required involvement in 
the safety programme. This non-deliberate departure from the formal organisation plan 
is ascribed to executive leadership failure to provide safety programme structure. The 
three primary communication typologies, but particularly lateral communication, 
remained ineffective due to the absence of a steering committee, thereby disabling 
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exchanges of safety product information required for decisions. The controlling function 
excluded the evaluation of safety programme effectiveness at steering committee level. 
In order to compensate for the inadequate safety programme structure described above, 
a lateral safety measurement system was implemented to provide direction and control 
for the organisation's safety programme. This model includes strategic and support 
programme elements as operational and classifies the function of these elements into two 
broad descriptive categories, namely a safety steering committee to direct and control 
the organisation's safety programme at subordinate management levels, and support 
programme elements to assist in the evaluation of programme effectiveness. These 
elements involve: (i) accident/incident analysis, (ii) baseline risk analyses, (iii) planned 
inspections, (iv) co-ordination of the safety programme, and (v) management leadership. 
Both categories of programme elements are structured for the participation of executive 
leadership and senior management, with defined roles for the key players, and both 
specify the evaluation of programme element compliance at middle and supervisory 
management levels. Broadly speaking, both categories are of an analytical nature, 
causally associated with measurements of compliance to safety programme standards 
and performance evaluation. The structure of the programme elements is of an 
independent explanatory nature, i.e. senior level executives do not require the assistance 
of staff groups or programme analyst at the operational level of the programme 
elements. 
Behavioural responses are classified into the five categories of leadership, informal 
organisation, communication, decision-making and controlling. Significantly, the safety 
steering committee was rated critical by executive leadership in terms of direction and 
control required for the organisation's safety policy. The definitional aspects of the 
steering committee and support programme elements, in terms of programme structures 
and standards, provided senior managers with systematic leadership. From an 
extrapolative standpoint, this aspect changed the structure of senior management's 
informal organisation. The previously recorded non-deliberate departures from safety 
programme management were reversed due to the paradigm shift in the senior 
managers' informal organisation. The participative approach afforded by the steering 
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committee and support variables/elements provided the means to disseminate 
information to and from subordinate levels of management through lateral, upward and 
downward communication. The category of lateral communication at steering 
committee level assured co-ordination of organisational objectives whilst simultaneously 
providing the basis for decisions required in terms of safety programme management. A 
negative aspect was identified, however, in the area of controlling. Although the five 
support programme elements detailed the required activities, structural deficiencies were 
identified under 'planned inspections'. The remaining four support programme 
elements, notably 'safety programme co-ordination', supported the evaluation of 
programme effectiveness. 
6.3.2 Chapter 4 : Middle management level 
Middle level executives, without a steering mechanism at the senior management level, 
were not able to co-ordinate the organisation's safety programme. Consequently, the 
safety committees chaired by middle managers were not utilised to lead safety 
programme interventions. Since methods of operation, notably guidelines needed for 
programme implementation, were not specified to middle managers, the informal 
organisation at this level remained non-committed to the safety effort. This constituted 
a non-deliberate departure from the formal organisation plan (Simon, Smithburg and 
Thompson, 1970). The exclusion of supervisors from safety committee structures 
limited lateral communication required for the attainment of organisational objectives, 
notably programme co-ordination (Nigro, 1965). Absence of this communication 
typology meant that the steering mechanism of the safety committee could not be 
utilised, the identification of latent and active errors at the operative/worker level 
moreover remained static (Reason 1997). Exclusion of the supervisory function 
withheld information essential for effective decision-making, nor could the chairman 
'laterally clear' safety issues with key subordinates. Consequently the organisation's 
safety policy could not be implemented. Finally, effective controlling was constrained 
through (a) lack of safety programme co-ordination due to lack of definitional 
guidelines, (b) middle managers not participating in safety inspections, and ( c) new 
design not being evaluated from a safety standpoint. 
112 
The test model developed for the middle managerial level encompassed strategic and 
support programme elements as discussed in the preceding evaluation. Again, 
programme elements were chosen for their analytical/evaluatory capabilities and 
independent explanatory power. The structure of the strategic programme element ( or 
safety committee) catered for the much-needed supervisory participation, whilst 
simultaneously evaluating key programme elements at the supervisory level, a concept 
not applied previously. The structure of five support programme elements provides 
evaluatory information to the safety committee for assessing programme effectiveness. 
The function of the support programme elements encompassed : (a) incident 
investigation, (b) issue-based risk assessments, ( c) new design/modifications, ( d) 
inspections, and (e) task hazard identification (an entirely new concept at this level). 
Both the strategic and support programme elements share a singular purpose : to 
measure compliance to safety programme standards at the supervisory level, evaluate 
performance as measured and introduce corrections if so required. The primary 
objective here is to identify resident accident pathogens already in place at the 
operational level, which can lead to latent and active failures in terms of accident 
causation (Reason, 1994). 
The restructured strategic programme element (safety committee) provided effective 
leadership for two reasons, namely mandatory supervisory participation and steering 
controls to evaluate support programme elements at both middle and supervisory 
management levels. Upon the introduction of the lateral safety system, the informal 
organisation ceased its non-deliberate departure from safety programme activities. The 
raised structure of the safety committee re-introduced the primary communication 
typologies, notably lateral communication, which enabled supervisory participation in 
terms of programme evaluation, as well as receiving communication from and 
disseminating to, the worker level. Further, decisions concerning the co-ordination of 
the safety programme at the supervisory level were based on lateral communication. The 
participation in the committee structure significantly influenced groupthink amongst 
middle managers which, since the inception of the original ill-defined safety programme, 
had collectively rationalized that specific safety standards were superfluous. The various 
categories of controlling were primarily based on the evaluatory mechanism of the safety 
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committee, planned inspections and task hazard evaluations (a new concept in terms of 
safety management). 
6.3.5 Chapter 5 : Supervisory management level 
The exclusion of supervisors from safety committees and the resultant inability of middle 
managers to co-ordinate the safety programme, disabled the capacity of supervisors to 
lead effective safety programme evaluation at the worker level. Workers/operatives 
perceived the non-involvement of supervisors in the safety effort as abdicatory. It 
follows that supervisors, without the structural guideline afforded by the steering 
mechanism ( safety committee) remained, in terms of the informal organisation, non-
committal about programme support. Similarly, the lack of participation on safety 
committee agendas implied failure of lateral communication and, by implication, of 
safety programme co-ordination at worker level. There was an outright failure of 
downward communication when supervisors did not brief workers on aspects of 
process safety, and of upward communication when supervisors did not convey to the 
safety committee issues raised at the worker level. The breakdown in the three primary 
communication typologies adversely affected decision-making required for programme 
co-ordination, ultimately preventing necessary procedural interventions. The structure 
of the safety committee with the exclusion of the supervisory function impeded the 
activities necessary to evaluate programme effectiveness, namely personal inspections 
and task observations. Neither of these elements was acted upon, nor were feedback 
requirements stipulated by middle management. 
The test model developed for the supervisory management level encompassed both 
strategic and support programme elements ( as discussed in the review of the preceding 
two chapters). However, one important proviso applies. Unlike the strategic 
programme elements at the senior and middle management levels, which were structured 
as a steering control mechanism (i.e. steering committee and safety committee 
respectively), the element of critical task procedures at supervisor level excludes an 
evaluatory mechanism. The decision for this particular type of structure is based on 
Pareto's Law as well as Reason's accident causation model discussed in Chapter 5. The 
analytical capability of the support programme elements incorporates the following 
functions: 
114 
committee, planned inspections and task hazard evaluations ( a new concept in terms of 
safety management). 
6.3.5 Chapter 5 : Supervisory management level 
The exclusion of supervisors from safety committees and the resultant inability of middle 
managers to co-ordinate the safety programme, disabled the capacity of supervisors to 
lead effective safety programme evaluation at the worker level. Workers/operatives 
perceived the non-involvement of supervisors in the safety effort as abdicatory. It 
follows that supervisors, without the structural guideline afforded by the steering 
mechanism ( safety committee) remained, in terms of the informal organisation, non-
committal about programme support. Similarly, the lack of participation on safety 
committee agendas implied failure of lateral communication and, by implication, of 
safety programme co-ordination at worker level. There was an outright failure of 
downward communication when supervisors did not brief workers on aspects of 
process safety, and of upward communication when supervisors did not convey to the 
safety committee issues raised at the worker level. The breakdown in the three primary 
communication typologies adversely affected decision-making required for programme 
co-ordination, ultimately preventing necessary procedural interventions. The structure 
of the safety committee with the exclusion of the supervisory function impeded the 
activities necessary to evaluate programme effectiveness, namely personal inspections 
and task observations. Neither of these elements was acted upon, nor were feedback 
requirements stipulated by middle management. 
The test model developed for the supervisory management level encompassed both 
strategic and support programme elements ( as discussed in the review of the preceding 
two chapters). However, one important proviso applies. Unlike the strategic 
programme elements at the senior and middle management levels, which were structured 
as a steering control mechanism (i.e. steering committee and safety committee 
respectively), the element of critical task procedures at supervisor level excludes an 
evaluatory mechanism. The decision for this particular type of structure is based on 
Pareto's Law as well as Reason's accident causation model discussed in Chapter 5. The 
analytical capability of the support programme elements incorporates the following 
functions: 
114 
(i) Accident recall, to compensate for default values (Rumelhart's schemata, 1977). 
(ii) Accident anticipatory task procedures (conceptually new to safety programmes). 
(iii) Hazard identification. 
(iv) Steering-based task instruction. 
(v) Critical task observation for measurements of operational compliance. 
The analytical/evaluatory capability of the restructured safety programme aimed to 
change the behavioural paradigm at supervisory level, with the identification of latent 
conditions and active errors as a prime motivation. 
Subsequent to the introduction of the revised programme, analyses in terms of 
organisational behaviour identified a particular weakness/non-conformance. Middle 
managers did not hold supervisors accountable for safety programme co-ordination, but 
continued to vest this authority in the worker-elected health and safety representatives. 
As a result, supervisors failed to co-ordinate the programme. The situation was 
redressed through the introduction of a specific process which evaluated safety 
programme compliance at worker level. Supervisory leadership benefited from 
measures of compliance. The structure afforded by the revised safety programme 
increased the commitment of supervisors, but not to the extent experienced at the 
middle and senior management levels. This slow shift within the informal organisation 
towards an affirmative response is attributed to middle level executives' failure to hold 
supervisors accountable. Hence the need to change the evaluation of support 
programme elements. Perceived groupthink at both the middle and supervisory 
management levels was identified as contributory. The three primary communication 
typologies were, due to limited supervisory involvement, not always effectively utilised, 
although downward communication was effectively deployed via task instructions. 
Middle managers neglected (in some areas) the supervisory accountability for 
programme co-ordination and this, given the dearth of lateral communication, led to 
organisational objectives being shelved. Evidence points to an avoidance of formal 
group diagnostic meetings by about 20% of the middle managers. As a result task 
accomplishments, including problem solving, were not discussed with supervisors 
(French & Bell, 1995: 171 ). In terms of broader applicability, the lateral safety system 
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did, however, provide the necessary structure for changing the behavioural paradigm at 
the supervisory level. 
6.4 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION: LINKING BEHAVIOURAL RESPONSE TO 
PROGRAMME ELEMENTS 
Prior to proposing a conceptual model for the identification and measurement of safety 
management systems, the next section of this paper discusses the difficulties of establishing 
linkages between behavioural response and programme elements. Safety systems can only be 
identified and measured in relation to an organisation's management levels (as discussed in the 
preceding chapters). The focus of effort so far has been to establish the above hypothesis. This 
excludes however, certain factors beyond the normative control of managers and individuals. 
Certain occurrences may induce failure in the various categories of behavioural response, and 
existing hazards are consequently not identified. Typical examples are psychological stresses 
induced by sources outside the organisation: these may include personal factors such as 
resource limitations, operational emergencies or improper motivation (Bird, 1986:28). It is 
feasible to imagine a scenario where a behavioural response occurs that directly or indirectly 
leads to a failure to identify a specific hazard in terms of the propagated lateral safety system 
proposed. For example, Rasmussen's model (skill-rule-knowledge framework) is primarily 
directed at critical errors made by those in supervisory control of industrial processes. 
Rasmussen as well as Reason recognise that the schematic processes which reconstruct past 
experiences may result from resource limitations ('bounded rationality') such as incorrect 
knowledge or misclassification of situations leading to the application of the wrong rule. 
A number of significant incidents, for example Chernobyl, Piper Alpha, and Bophal (India) fall 
into the categories described above. Neither Bird et al. (1986) nor Stranks (1994) in their 
respective expositions on safety programme effectiveness address cognitive control mechanisms 
that are error-orientated. The inadequacy of safety control systems which ignore cognitive 
knowledge structures or schemata is reflected in the static accident frequency rates of industrial 
operations such as the general manufacturing industry (SA). 
The author of this dissertation postulates, therefore, the evaluation of safety programme 
elements in terms of both effective behavioural response and the role played by schemata in 
116 
past accidents. Contemporary schema theorists such as Rumelhart (1975), Schmidt (1995) and 
particularly Reason and Rasmussen, have provided successful frameworks to clarify the nature 
of interaction between incoming episodic information and generic information embodied in 
schemata, 'the relationships between new and old knowledge' (Reason). The objective, 
therefore, was to integrate a conceptual framework that would compensate for schemata-
induced error as well as support the categories of organisational behaviour. Accordingly, a 
lateral safety system with emphasis on task hazard identification and accident recall was 
developed for the purposes of this dissertation. The system includes steering controls which 
evaluate programme effectiveness on an ongoing basis, particularly strategic programme 
elements such as critical task procedures. 
The next section briefly reviews the frameworks of existing 'market' safety programmes, 
conceptually evaluating the basic controlling typologies, organisational (managerial) integration 
and structures governing behavioural response. 
6.5 CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF CURRENT SAFETY PROGRAMMES: A 
CRITIQUE 
6.5.1 Introductory 
This section of the paper discusses the structure of existing 'market' safety programmes 
and the concepts applied to assure process safety in general industry. The overall 
effectiveness of programme structures is evaluated. 
6.5.2 Market leader : NOSA 
The NOSA safety programme is presently grouped into six categories of programme 
elements. Measurement methodologies assess an organisation's compliance to statutory 
(legal) regulations, as well as the safety of industrial processes in terms of people, 
equipment, materials and environment. Physical conditions (plant, machinery) are 
required to meet certain operational safety standards. 
The NOSA programme has been tested successfully for over nearly five decades. 
Implementation of this programme has resulted in the reduction of industrial accident 
frequency rates. A central critique of the NOSA programme is that managerial 
involvement is not specified. Consequently, lack of managerial commitment remains a 
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primary factor in accident causation, in particular the managerial response to identified 
hazards. This is reflected in the punctuated occurrence of accidents and near-miss 
incidents with high loss potential. Significantly, the structure of managerial programme 
elements in the NOSA framework excludes performance standards for executive 
leadership. Lack of commitment to the safety programme was identified via quantitative 
assessments which implicated particularly leadership, informal organisation and 
controlling programme compliance. This is primarily attributed to managerial activities 
not being specified in the broader framework of the NOSA programme. The structure 
of programme elements is not specific in terms of managerial involvement, an aspect 
which this dissertation has sought to address. A feasibility study was conducted by the 
author for reasons of integrating the lateral safety system into the NOSA programme. 
This programme has run concurrently since 1994. Indications are that managerial safety 
programme specifications as espoused by the lateral safety system, effectively 
supplement the NOSA programme. This was established via quantitative assessments 
during the above time period. 
6.6 LATERAL SAFETY SYSTEM CONCEPT: OVERALL IMPLICATIONS 
6.6.1 Safety management systems conceptualised schematically 
6.6.1.1 introductory 
Lateral safety systems are defined, identified and measured in terms of three conceptual 
frameworks: 
(i) Identification of specific programme elements for each management level. 
(ii) Integration of three basic types of control into programme elements. 



















The interaction of these elements constitutes a lateral safety system. It follows that a 
primary concern of the safety programme analyst is to identify the relevant programme 
elements that will govern a specific management level, as safety programme 
effectiveness is conceptually determined by managerial activities (Reason, 1994, 1997). 
Explicit conceptual frameworks such as the one discussed above are currently not 
available. Existing frameworks of safety programmes exclude the taxonomies of 















Figure 5. Exhibit 6A. Conceptual framework of a safety system. 
Basic 
Controlling 
The interaction of these elements constitutes a lateral safety system. It follows that a 
primary concern of the safety programme analyst is to identify the relevant programme 
elements that will govern a specific management level, as safety programme 
effectiveness is conceptually determined by managerial activities (Reason, 1994, 1997). 
Explicit conceptual frameworks such as the one discussed above are currently not 
available. Existing frameworks of safety programmes exclude the taxonomies of 
managerial specificity, strategic function and basic controlling. The above taxonomies 
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however, represent an improvement on methods which offer no conceptualisation of 
managerial activities. Their advantage is that they allow programme elements in the 
organisational hierarchy - including predisposition in terms of behavioural response - to 
be described and classified. 
6.6.1.2 integrating safety management system into current safety programmes 
The adaptive potential of the lateral safety system, as well as the strategic predisposition 
of the programme elements in terms of behavioural response, enables one to link this 
model to current safety programmes. The process suggested by the author to 
restructure the concept of 'market' safety programmes encompasses a three step 
approach. 
( i ) Linking programme elements to managerial levels 
Current safety system models are structured primarily as a bureaucratic checklist of 
risks. They have failed to produce a conceptual model orientated towards the 
identification and measurement of programme elements adapted to the organisational 
hierarchy. Further, current structures detail the operational requirements set by 
programme elements, but conceptually exclude interaction between programme 
elements. Since the information or historical record generated by a set of programme 
elements remains insular, i.e. the information is not used in conjunction with other 
elements or models for safety analyses and evaluations, managerial levels lack specific 
information required for effective forecasting of safety strategy. This is also in part 
comparable to the 'scalar' or pyramid hierarchical structures of organisations 
(Nigro: 197), which fail to indicate the lateral interaction between instances/elements on 
the same level. It is not suggested, however, to restructure the current checklist-type of 
safety programmes entirely, but to regroup certain key programme elements in terms of 
the managerial function. (Current safety programmes vary in their number of 
programme elements from twenty to eighty, with sub-divisions ranging to roughly four 
hundred.) 
As a first step, safety programme element structures should be identified in terms of 
evaluatory ( steering mechanisms) and interactive processes. Conceptions of these vary, 
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depending on the choice of the safety programme analyst. It is stressed, however, that 
programme elements are strategically chosen to enable managers to evaluate programme 
effectiveness. Further, the number of variables/elements chosen for a programme 
element structure is limited to six, as managers cannot seriously give attention to more 
than six different objectives (Newman, 1975). See Exhibit 6b below. 
Control Systems: 













Current-day safety programmes would need to be redesigned to include a lateral safety 
system. However, some of the checklist typologies, rules and procedures of market 
safety programmes need not be altered. Required however, is the introduction of 
programme elements which conceptually evaluate programme effectiveness. Secondly, 
121 
programme elements must be reconceptualised according to the function required by the 
lateral safety system. 
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(ii) Altering existing non-evaluatory frameworks 
As discussed above 6.6.1.2(i), programme elements with steering control - evaluation 
capability replace the 'yes-no' controlling structures of current programme elements. At 
the senior management level, the concept and/or function of safety programme 
evaluation is lacking in all major safety programmes. Accordingly, a steering mechanism 
is introduced at the executive leadership level (as part of the organisation's safety 
steering committee) to provide direction and control for the safety programme. This 
conceptual schematisation is repeated for the middle managerial level, where existing 
ordinary committee structures are changed to facilitate programme evaluation. Please 
note that the supervisory level is excluded from this as the programme evaluation 
process is maintained by the middle management safety committees. Evaluation of 
programme effectiveness at the operational interfaces is assured however, by the 
function of support programme elements at the supervisory level. 
(iii) Reconciling the distinction between individual and organisational accidents 
This dissertation has sought to address human performance in terms of the individual in 
an organisational setting, examining the differences between individual and 
organisational accidents. There is a belief held by many technical managers that the main 
threat to process safety is posed by the behavioural and motivational shortcomings of 
operatives/ workers at the 'rockface' (Reason, 1997:223). For these managers, the 
often-repeated statistic that 80-95% of all accidents/ incidents are due to human error 
means that human inadequacies and errant actions are perceived as the primary causes of 
accidents. This particular mindset chooses to ignore the conditions or systems under 
which people work. Furthermore, it ignores the evidence that most solutions to human 
performance are technical rather than behavioural (Reason, 1977: 224). 
A particularly effective method of resolving these apparent conflicts is to recognise the 
three models for managing safety distinguished by Deborah Lucas. The following 
analysis reviews the structure of the lateral safety management system in terms of the 
three-model concept. 
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The person model 
This model exemplifies the traditional occupational safety approach. As such, it includes 
awareness campaigns, safety audits and inspections, 'safe work' procedures and safety 
training. Progress is measured by a star-rating system, and by a record of disabling 
injuries incurred by the organisation. In relating this model conceptually to the steering 
mechanisms employed by this dissertation, it is apparent that the functions of 
awareness, audits and training are reflected in the programme elements, but with greater 
specificity in terms of hazard identification (which is critical to process safety). For 
example, the identification of hazards is repeated at all three management levels. At this 
point in time ( 1998), Koeberg has achieved its lowest disabling injury frequency rate 
since it started operating commercially in 1986. It needs to be pointed out, however, 
that a low disabling injury frequency rate is no guarantee, whatsoever, that the integrity 
of a particular installation is beyond question in terms of safety. On the contrary, a 
methane underground fire occurred in one of the SASOL coal collieries on the day they 
were awarded a 95% safety compliance rating, with a disabling frequency rate less than 
one (Star, 1977). Further, in contrast to the generic nature of training in current market 
programmes, the safety management system focuses on the specificity of critical tasks. 
The engineering model 
Human error, in the context of the engineering model, is regarded as a consequence of 
human-machine mismatches, in other words, failure on the part of system designers to 
take into account the 'cognitive strengths and weaknesses of human controllers' 
(Reason, 1997:225). The engineering model focuses on how operatives are influenced 
by the informational properties of the human-machine interface. Practical applications 
include hazard operability studies, technical audits, cognitive task analyses and 
ergonomics, to name a few. The safety management model has sought to incorporate 
the engineering model by means of task/process observations by supervisory staff and 
workers, with a feedback mechanism to the middle management level safety committees. 
Further, the evaluation of new design or modification to existing processes is carried out 
at middle management level, with a feedback loop to the senior management level safety 
steering committee. 
The organisational model 
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The organisational model views human error more as a consequence than a cause. 
Reason correctly states that ' errors are symptoms that reveal the presence of latent 
conditions/ resident accident pathogens in industrial systems under which people 
work'. The organisational model emphasizes the need for proactive measures so that 
human error cannot adversely affect the integrity of existing defences. As such, the 
organisational model seeks constantly to evaluate the effectiveness of safety control 
systems for one purpose only: the identification of active and latent failures/conditions 
which might breach a system's defences. This will include, typically, evaluation of 
hazards due to extended exposure and accumulation of latent conditions that can occur 
in the managerial, maintenance and operational spheres. The organisational model 
therefore deals with the integrity of defences and broader systemic factors. A keypoint 
to note (constantly emphasized, firstly by Reason but also by Bird et al.): effective 
safety risk management requires continuous evaluation of factors that may breach a 
system's defences. For the purpose of this dissertation, typical examples of programme 
elements which conceptually evaluate safety system effectiveness have been: 
• Supervisory level: measuring compliance to operational standards via task observations 
with a feedback loop to the middle management level. 
• Middle management level: evaluating supervisory measurements of compliance to task 
procedures and hazard identification. 
• Executive leadership : co-ordinating the safety programme with middle managers by 
evaluating feedback on key programme elements such as task hazard identification, 
accident/incident analyses and task observations. 
6.7. CONCLUSION 
The framework of the safety management system proposed by the author met the objective of 
this dissertation: a continuous evaluatory or steering process for the identification and 
measurement oflatent conditions and active errors. The structure of programme elements is 
geared to identify hazards and measure compliance, with a feedback loop to and from super-
ordinate management levels. 
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The framework of the safety system management demonstrably reconciles the three different 
approaches to safety management : (a) the person model, directed at reducing personal injury events, 
(b) the engineering model, focusing on the person-machine interface and system reliability, and (c) the 
organisational model, providing a conceptual evaluatory framework and broader systemic factors for 
effectively managing process safety. 
As a postscript, the author would like to voice his concern that the concept of safety management is not 
currently taught in tertiary institutions in South Africa. In view of the magnitude of southern Africa's 
mining sector and the location of heavy, and manufacturing industries throughout the country, safety 
nianagement should form part of the curriculum for engineering and the building environment, 
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